Oral History Program Kevin Sullivan Interviewed by Alyssa Kammerman 3 March 2021 Oral History Program Weber State University Stewart Library Ogden, Utah Kevin Sullivan Interviewed by Alyssa Kammerman 3 March 2021 Copyright © 2025 by Weber State University, Stewart Library Mission Statement The Oral History Program of the Stewart Library was created to preserve the institutional history of Weber State University and the Davis, Ogden and Weber County communities. By conducting carefully researched, recorded, and transcribed interviews, the Oral History Program creates archival oral histories intended for the widest possible use. Interviews are conducted with the goal of eliciting from each participant a full and accurate account of events. The interviews are transcribed, edited for accuracy and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewees (as available), who are encouraged to augment or correct their spoken words. The reviewed and corrected transcripts are indexed, printed, and bound with photographs and illustrative materials as available. The working files, original recording, and archival copies are housed in the University Archives. Project Description The Hill/DDO’95 oral history project documents the 1995 and 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process and its impact on Utah. In 1993, rumors started to circulate that Hill Air Force Base and Defense Depot Ogden (DDO) would be closed by the 1995 round of BRAC, causing state officials, local government, and local grassroots lobbying group, Hill/DDO’95, to spring into action to save Utah’s military installations from closure or realignment to other facilities. This project includes interviews from a wide range of players, from congressmen, state officials, members of Hill/DDO’95, and the civilian employees of Hill Air Force Base and (DDO). Their accounts describe the process of fighting for the base, the closure of DDO, the formation of the Utah Defense Alliance (UDA) and Military Installation Development Authority (MIDA) from the Hill/DDO’95 group, and their fight to save Hill Air Force Base all over again in 2005. Also discussed is the importance of the F-35 aircraft and the “Falcon Hill” Enhanced Use Lease project to the prosperity of Hill Air Force Base and military relations in Utah. ____________________________________ Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account. It reflects personal opinion offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable. ____________________________________ Rights Management This work is the property of the Weber State University, Stewart Library Oral History Program. It may be used freely by individuals for research, teaching and personal use as long as this statement of availability is included in the text. It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows: Sullivan, Kevin, an oral history by Alyssa Kammerman, 3 March 2021, WSU Stewart Library Oral History Program, University Archives, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden, UT. iii Abstract: This is an oral history interview with Kevin Sullivan. It was conducted on March 3, 2021 at Weber State University Stewart Library. Sullivan recalls his experiences with the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure as the Director of the Ogden Air Logistics Center Aircraft Directorate, and with the 2005 BRAC as the commander of the Ogden ALC. Sullivan describes the efforts made by military personnel on base for the BRAC commissioners’ visit in May 1995 as “Portray the Base” efforts, rather than the community’s “Save the Base” efforts. Sullivan remembers efforts to gather and present research on Hill Air Force Base for BRAC 2005 and the reasons why he felt Hill AFB was more secure during the 2005 round. The interviewer is Alyssa Kammerman. Also in the room is Sarah Langsdon. AK: Today is March 3, 2021. We are speaking with Kevin Sullivan for the BRAC 1995 project. My name is Alyssa Kammerman, and I'll be conducting the interview. With me is Sarah Langsdon on the camera. Kevin, thank you again for visiting with us today. KS: Sure. AK: I just wanted to start out, I know in the email you sent Guy after our initial event, you were mentioning that even though the base personnel during 1995 were restricted in what they could do during the 1995 BRAC, that you still would be able to give us an on-the-base perspective. So, I'm wanting to tap into that and see what BRAC was like from the perspective of people on the base. KS: Sure. Well, it varied a little bit, depending on whether you were civilian or military. Obviously, if you are a military member, if Hill closed, you are going to get 1 another assignment. You were going to go somewhere else and your career was going to continue. It might have been an irritation or a disturbance of sorts, but it wasn't a huge deal for your career. If you were a DOD civilian, you were looking at possibly losing jobs, having to transfer to another part of the country. If you're a civilian, you didn't join to transfer to another part of the country. You joined because you want to stay at Hill. So, a little bit different for the two groups of folks. But there was still a fair amount of anxiety across the board on the base. We didn't do “save the base” things, we did “portray the base” things. I would describe it as we knew we were getting a visit from a commissioner. I believe we had two commissioners visit us. So, there were briefings and tours that we had to get ready for. Our goal was to put our best foot forward on the base and we would rely on the community to put their best foot forward off the base. Our job there was to show how well we did things and try to impress commissioners as opposed to off-base where I think they were doing a lot more maybe political activities or advocacy activities. Our job was not advocacy. Our job was to portray what we did. AK: Were there military members that were allowed to help out with “save the base” efforts? KS: I suspect there were. There's probably a good chance there were people along the roadways that may have been military dependents. You certainly couldn't do it in uniform. I don't recall exactly what the guidance was, but I'm sure there were military members and military dependents that were off base waving flags and doing those kinds of things; probably less so actually interfacing with the 2 community on strategy or interfacing with the community in terms of how are we going to protect the base? That would have been off-limits for military personnel. I know there were some particular civilian members that were maybe a little bit more engaged than the Air Force might have envisioned. But we had pretty clear guidance that our job was not to advocate for the base, not to protect the base, just to let people know what the base did. AK: So, during that time you were a colonel and I'm not quite sure what all your specific "MOS," what that would entail. But can you tell me a little bit about your BRAC experience and what you were doing to help portray the base? KS: When they came in '95, I was the director of the aircraft directorate, which was, at the time—we've reorganized three times since then—but it was the largest directorate on the base, responsible for all of the aircraft maintenance that goes on, responsible for a couple of program offices, and then responsible for a lot of the off-equipment work that was done. Blackbox repair, those types of things. So pretty big job for a colonel at the time, and mostly production, mostly wage grade, mostly blue-collar workers working for me. AK: Okay. When we interviewed Pat Condon, he mentioned that you would have had a little bit more contact with the blue-collar workers at the time. What was the feeling that you got from them? KS: They were scared. Starting about a year out from the actual closure decisions, I would go out once or twice a week and work with small work groups, maybe 20 or 30 folks, and talk to them about base closure. My message to them was, “Let's look at the criteria. Let's forget about the fact that the prevailing wisdom in the Air 3 Force is that Hill was going to close,” because it was. I said, “Let's look at the criteria and let's see how Hill measures up to the criteria.” My assessment early on was we were safe. If you simply looked at the criteria, forget about the politics, forgot about the prevailing wisdom, if you looked at the criteria and bounced Hill's capabilities against that criteria, my sense was we were very safe and that was my message to them. I had a 20 or so slide briefing that I would go over with them. I don't know whether it made them feel better or not. It made me feel better. I was convinced after going through that and putting together this pitch to the folks who work for me, I was convinced that we were pretty safe. One of the interesting things was, the first question I used to ask them, and when I first started this, General Lyles was the commander. It wasn't Pat Condon. The first question I would ask them is, “Do you think General Lyles was sent here to close the base?” Invariably the whole room would raise their hand. They were absolutely convinced that our commander at the time was there to close the base. That was his job. I don't remember it quite as much in relation to General Condon when he came in, but they were certainly convinced that Condon's predecessor was sent here to close the base. Absolutely. I tried to disabuse them of that notion, but I'm not sure I did. AK: That was partly because of General Condon's background, is that correct? KS: Well, it wasn't Condon that they were most concerned about, it was General Lyles who preceded him. I mean, General Condon came from the headquarters. Half of them wouldn't have known that to be honest with you. They really wouldn't have known what his background was. They were just convinced that, and I think 4 because the prevailing wisdom was that Sacramento and Ogden were going to close. I think the prevailing wisdom was that any commander at the time had probably been told, "You're going to close the base." But as it turned out, it wasn't true. Although I do think Pat Condon probably told you that General Yates said to him when he got the command, "Congratulations, you'll be the last commander at Ogden Air Logistics Center." AK: I think he did say that. KS: Yeah, I think General Yates told him that. But General Yates didn't get a vote. AK: There's that. So, the workers that were under you, you said they were mainly blue-collar workers since they were civilian, is that correct? KS: Right. I probably had 98 percent civilian employees working for me. AK: Okay, that's good to know. What do you remember of the main 1995 base visit from the commissioners? KS: You know, I don't remember a lot about their visit. I remember we had them in a room, we briefed them on what they asked to be briefed on, and we were given a template to go through to brief them. Our guidance was, “This is not an advocacy briefing, this is a briefing to tell them what you do here and how you do it. I think there were two commissioners and there were probably a handful of staffers with them. I'm sure they toured the base, and I'm sure they came through my organization. But I just don't remember that part. I do remember briefing them. I was not a briefer. I briefed in ‘93, but I didn't brief in ‘95. It was Ron Ora, I think, who did most of the briefing AK: When you said briefing, is that for the commission? 5 KS: For the commission. Yeah. For the commissioners. AK: Okay. You mentioned ‘93, do you feel like ‘93 BRAC and also especially the closing of the Tooele Army Depot changed your approach to— KS: You know, I don't think Tooele impacted us much at all. Didn't impact me because I was here for both of them. I guess we knew Tooele closed, or it didn't close, it downsized. They lost a lot of mission. What I think got our attention in ‘93 was the fact that we did lose a little bit of work. I was running an organization called the Munitions Division at the time and the reason I briefed was they were looking at some of our air-to-air missile work that they were going to move and that in fact did move in ‘93. We knew in ‘93 that there was a potential to lose some work, but I think the biggest thing that got our attention in ‘95 was it was pretty clear the Air Force was going to close two Air Logistics Centers. They were pretty open about that. As I said before, the prevailing wisdom was Hill would be one of them, that we were one of the two smallest, we were an overfly state; a lot of the senior leadership doesn't come out to Hill a lot unless you work to get them here. So, we believed we were vulnerable. We also knew we were vulnerable politically. I mean, that was a Clinton administration. I believe Clinton had run third in this state behind Ross Perot. I forget who he ran against, but we knew we weren't politically strong. I think that's what got our attention more than anything that happened at Tooele. The fact that we had lost a little bit of work in ‘93 and the fact that the prevailing wisdom was Hill was gone. 6 AK: The Air Force only had three Air Logistics Centers. Do you know why they wanted to close two of them? KS: No, we had five at the time. AK: Oh, that's what I meant, sorry. KS: It was a workload issue. The assessment was that we didn't have enough work to keep five centers open and that the work could be easily spread between three. As it turned out, I think that was a pretty good assessment. AK: What were some of the differences you saw, I mean, obviously, 1995 you said the biggest concern was that you knew that two of the Air Logistics Centers would close, and that Ogden didn't have as much political clout. But what were some of the other differences between 1993 and 1995? KS: Well for me, in 1993, they were targeting some of the workload that I was responsible for. We did not get a visit from commissioners. We had staffers in ’93, and they were looking at a very discreet set of work. It was air to air missile work, which in fact they did end up moving to Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania. My involvement was maybe a little bit more hands-on during the visit, maybe less hands-on in terms of the overall prep than it was in ‘95, because I had moved up between ‘93 and ‘95 in terms of my job. I was really more part of the corporate leadership of the center in ’95 than I was in ‘93. The reason I was involved in ‘93 is because they were looking at some of my work. AK: Okay, gotcha. Were there any other preparations that you or your workers under you were a part of like integration for the commissioner's visit? 7 KS: Pretty much. I mean, obviously some clean-up. We wanted to put our best foot forward, but between clean up and then a lot of senior leadership strategy sessions in terms of what our briefing was going to look like, where we were going to take them, those types of things. Once again, wanting to put our best foot forward as the commissioners visited us. So, making sure the places they were going looked the way we wanted them to look, making sure we told the right story. That was pretty much, as I recall, what we did to get ready. AK: I think it was Jeanette Bonnell who was saying that they even put down fresh new grass. KS: I don't recall that, I wouldn't be surprised. Like I said, we were not in an advocacy role, but we certainly wanted to put the best foot forward. I mean, we were proud of what we did out there, and we wanted to make sure that they saw it. We were also conscious, even the military members were conscious that closing Hill would have a devastating effect on the local community. So, even though it wasn't going to impact my career, I was pretty sensitive to the impact it would have on the local career community. I think all the military members were. AK: Something that actually just occurred to me, I'm asking this because I know obviously McClellan closed, but Kelly, it sounded like a lot of it its work was mostly realigned, as opposed to the whole base being closed, is that correct? KS: Well, what happened to Kelly is the Clinton administration got involved and some of the work was retained in place, but it was privatized, as I recall. That was largely due to the fact that President Clinton wasn't happy with the results, either at McClellan or at Kelly, but they retained some work there that was privatized in 8 place. That wasn't exactly what was envisioned during the closure process. His administration got in and mucked a little bit, particularly at Kelly, in order to retain some work there. AK: My main question with that is, where they were wanting to close Air Logistics Centers, would that mean that Hill Air Force base would be closed? KS: We believed that to be the case. The reason for that is, if you just closed the Air Logistics Center and you kept the other 60 mission partners out there—most of them were pretty small, the biggest obviously being the 388th and the 419th fighter wings—you still have to have a front gate. You still have to have a commissary. You still have to have a BX. You still have to maintain the roads. You still have to mow the grass. You still have to plow the roads in the winter. So, you're not getting that much savings. The way you really get a savings is you close the installation. Then you don't have to man the gates. You don't have to cut the grass. You don't have to do any of that. So, our sense was that Hill would close if the Air Logistics Center was going to close, and that's what happened at McClellan and that's what happened to Kelly, other than the fact that they privatized a lot of that in place. AK: So, Kelly, the base itself is closed, but the work is still—? KS: Yes, the base is closed. I think Boeing, I forget who does it, but I think they still do some larger airplane work down there. AK: That makes sense. So, in 1995, was some of the Air Logistics Center work at Hill, did that include some of the missile work as well? 9 KS: Right. That was all there at the time. I'm convinced that the reason Hill stayed open was because of the missile work. You can do little airplanes anywhere. I mean we do little airplanes at Hill. You could pick that up and move it pretty easily. It's hard to move a computed tomography facility, which is a big MRI facility. It's hard to move all that storage space. It's hard to move a silo. It's hard to move a launch control center, which they have on base, a couple of them. I'm convinced that the cost and the magnitude of trying to relocate the missile work is really what kept Hill open. Sullivan's view, I'm not sure everyone agrees, but that's my view. AK: What workloads did Hill Air Force Base gain from McClellan and Kelly? KS: I told Don Casel I was going to tell him that you should ask him that. I was gone by then, but Don was here, I think. The A10 work for sure came from McClellan, we got some black box work from McClellan. Beyond that, I'm just not sure. It was more than that, I know. The A10 program office moved to Hill. Beyond that, I just don't recall. Fairly significant chunks of work, but there was more than that. I just don't recall what it was. But I told Don that he would have that information for you. I don't know whether he gave that in his response or not. AK: Do you happen to know, and I know you said that you were gone at this point, but do you happen to know if the Utah Defense Alliance had any part in helping the transition of McClellan workers? KS: You know, that's another one I think Cazel would be better able to help you with—either him or Ernie Parada. I don't know. I know that Hill sent teams out there to both bases to talk to people that were considering relocating. Exactly 10 what the community did, I'm not sure. I would not be surprised if the community helped, and either Vicki McCall or Steve Rush could help you with that. But I know the base itself sent teams out to both Kelly and McClellan to talk to the people that were considering moving. AK: Just out of curiosity, where did you go after '95? KS: I went to Wright Patterson in Ohio, in Dayton. AK: Did you see any BRAC aftermath over there at all? KS: Boy, not really. I was the inspector general for the Air Force Materiel Command at the time, and people were more afraid of me than I was of them. I didn't really notice much at the headquarters. I think most of that activity occurred obviously at the closing locations and then places like Hill. I mean, it took Hill a couple of years to absorb that workload and it was not the easiest thing in the world for them to do. It was at least a year's worth of six o'clock meetings with the then vice commander to try to accommodate all that work that came in. AK: So, you were the Ogden ALC commander during the BRAC 2005? KS: I was. AK: How did your involvement with BRAC 2005 differ from 1995? KS: Sure. Well, first of all, 2005, there just wasn't much to it. It was mostly a realignment. We knew that. We knew we weren't particularly vulnerable. There wasn't this huge concern over the installation closing or concern over what would happen to the community. So that was considerably different. I was more involved. I was the certifying official for all the information that left the base. We did not have a visit from staffers or commissioners. It was a 11 terrible process, quite frankly. We were given questions to answer that were based on scenarios of apparently closure and realignment. But we didn't know what they were. We were just given questions, and so in a lot of cases, we were shooting in the dark because we didn't understand the context of the question. Even when we would go back and ask our major command headquarters, they in many cases didn't know the context of the question. I'm convinced we gave them some bad information simply because nothing was in context. They had developed scenarios which might have involved moving certain things to different places, and then they developed questions as a result of those scenarios. Well, we didn't know what the scenario was, so we didn't know what the context of the question was. It was very difficult for us to answer a lot of those questions. We had those conversations back and forth with the headquarters. It's a little bit different kind of closure scenario. I think it's because they didn't want to spook the herd in terms of the scenarios they were looking at. They didn't want the people answering the questions to know that these questions are based on moving all the missile work out of Hill for example. That obviously wasn't the case, but it was difficult for us to respond to those questions. We did as best we could, and I certified all that data that went off the installation. I looked at everything. I looked at all the questions. I looked at all the responses. So, a little bit different, well, a lot different scenario. But there was not the threat. Obviously, we wanted to make sure we answered correctly and at least put as 12 much positive spin on the responses as we could. But it was a just totally different scenario. AK: That's really interesting. I hadn't heard that from anyone else that they had asked those questions. Were they kind of like, "Theoretically, if we were to move a certain fighter wing—" KS: You didn't even get that part. You didn't even get the "theoretically." You would get a question that might be related to that scenario, but you didn't know what the scenario was. Jim Sutton managed all that for me. I don't know whether you've talked to Jim or not, but Jim would have probably a more detailed feel than I would. But I'll tell you, it was frustrating for him and it was frustrating for his people and it was frustrating for me, because even when we asked questions, it was difficult to get answers that enabled us to answer those questions to the best of our ability. AK: This might be more of a question for Jim Sutton, but do you happen to know how they went about answering those? Was there a way to kind of study out— KS: I mean, what we did is the questions came into Jim's office or a portion of Jim's office, we farmed them out to the subject matter experts, and then they all came back through Jim's office, and we did a logic check on them. Then they came to me and I certified the responses. Sometimes we had to go back to the subject matter experts and help them decide what they really wanted to say. But that's really what Jim did was provide a logic check on those things for us. It was really valuable because some of the questions were so blind, we needed some office to root them through so there was some degree of consistency in how we answered 13 them, the way we answer them. That's kind of what Jim did, among other things. But he's the one that would bring all those to me and I would certify the responses. AK: Do you have any ideas as to why they did it that way? KS: I think for the most part, because they didn't want us to know the scenarios. They didn't want to spook people by telling them, “Hey, we're considering closing the 388th fighter wing,” because they don't want to spook the 388th fighter wing. In retrospect, they might have been better off spooking the herd because I think they would have gotten better answers to their questions. It was a frustrating process that we went through. I can tell you that. AK: I can imagine. You mentioned that the commissioners never came and visited Hill Air Force Base. KS: I don't recall a visit. Some staffers might have come, but I don't recall a visit in 2005. AK: Do you feel like that affected maybe the nerves of the workers in that they weren't even coming to see the base in person? KS: I don't think so. In fact, I think the workforce would be more concerned, more on edge if they knew people were coming. So, I don't think that was a concern for them. AK: Okay, so it was more maybe that Hill Air Force Base wasn't as much a target, if it was— KS: Yeah, and we knew that. As it turned out, we did realign some work. There was a fair amount of realignment that occurred on the base, but the work didn't go 14 away. It just realigned under different organizations. We knew that the 2005 round of BRAC wasn't going to be very impacting, it was kind of a nothing burger, really, for us. AK: You mentioned that there was some work that was realigned? KS: Right, it was realigned in place for the most part. We may have had some go, but for the most part, it was realigned, a fair amount of work that had been done by the Ogden Air Logistics Center realigned to the Defense Logistics Agency. It realigned in place, but who was the organization that was responsible for it changed. A lot of our supply chain work changed. AK: So, was the Defense Logistics Agency—I feel like I haven't heard much about that—was that something that was on base already? KS: They were on base anyway. They did some work on base anyway. But a lot more work was aligned to DLA in 2005 than had been aligned to them before. AK: Was DLA also the organization, if you will, that was over the DDO before '95? KS: Yeah, they worked for DLA. Right. AK: Okay. I think I heard that before but I wanted to make sure. KS: Yeah, they did. AK: So, I was just getting oriented in my head. You're answering so many of my questions, which is awesome, I'm just making sure I'm not missing any of them. We've spoken to Tom Miner a little bit, but it looks like he left in 2003— KS: Yeah, he bailed out on me [laughs]. AK: Do you happen to know; did the executive director position remain after he left? 15 KS: Yeah. What the difference was that before Tom came to Hill, we had a commander and we had a vice commander. When Tom first came, the vice commander position went away. We had a commander and we had an executive director. During Tom's tenure, a decision was made to bring the vice commander back, and there were different reasons for that. A lot of it had to do with actually growing general officers. But at any rate, for a while, it was the commander and Tom. Then we brought back a vice commander while Tom was there. But when Tom left, we replaced him. Don Cazel replaced Tom Miner, although I had to wait six months for him. Tom retired about six months after I took command, and then I waited about six months for Cazel to come in. AK: From your perspective, what was the advantage to having both an executive director and a two-star vice commander at that time? KS: Well, actually, when I was the commander, we had a two-star commander, an executive director, a one-star vice commander, and a one-star maintenance wing commander. From a front office Air Logistics Center standpoint, having a twostar, a one-star, and an executive director was overkill. We did not need three people. We probably need about two and a half. What the executive director brings to the party is his knowledge of the civilian personnel system. Typically, a Tom Miner or a Don Cazel would focus on the civilian personnel piece. Not solely. I mean, we kind of worked as a team, but that was kind of his bailiwick. Having the vice commander, the one-star there gives you another uniformed officer that you could send places if you needed to, and the two-star had no job [laughs]. The two-star just directed the whole thing. We didn't need 16 those three people in the front office. We really didn't. I did it by myself for probably six months because I was without a vice commander. Miner retired, and it took me about six months to get Don Cazel in. So, it was about a two-and-ahalf-person front office, to be honest with you. But what the executive director brings, what the Tom Miners and the Don Cazels bring is civilian personnel knowledge and then corporate knowledge of Air Force Materiel Command, which in some cases commanders don't have. I mean, I had been stationed at Hill before, so I had some experience, but it wasn't uncommon that you would get a two-star in that had no experience in Air Force Materiel Command. They didn't speak Air Logistics Center. They didn't speak civilian. The other thing is that the executive directors’ tenure tended to be a little longer. I mean, I was there for a long time. I was there for four years. But typically, the commander’s here for two years and those executive directors are there for four to seven. Miner was there forever. He was there for ten. So, they bring some corporate knowledge of the organization as well. What you really need probably is one two-star. What we needed at the time was probably the two-star and the executive director. The one-star was there and typically he was a colonel. He was a baby one-star. They were there to learn as much as anything so that we could grow them into commanders later on. AK: So, I know you're joking, but when you say two and a half, what would the halfperson do? 17 KS: Well, I'm saying it's about two and a half persons worth of work. It really wasn't three persons. Like I said, I did it myself for six months, but it was nice to have the other uniform there, the one-star. Typically, it was a colonel who had been selected for promotion to brigadier general. You could offload some things that required a military member to do, and it was a place for them to learn. As much as anything, it was a place to put them to help them grow into being a general officer. AK: Okay, that makes sense. How was UDA involved in BRAC 2005? KS: I don't know. I can only tell you that early in the process, I invited a large number of community members, some were UDA, some weren't, and just explained to them what I could do with them, for them, to them. It wasn't much. We all signed non-disclosure agreements, any of us that were involved in gathering and certifying data. I had some pretty strict guidance in terms of what I could do and what I could work with the local community on. I just brought people in and told them, and what they did after that, I'm not sure, to be perfectly honest with you. Once again, we didn't have the threat in 2005 that we had in '95. So, I would just defer to the UDA folks. I just don't know. AK: It sounds like the community wasn’t as concerned. KS: No, they weren't, and there was no reason for them to be, but in some cases I mean they were concerned. Governor Walker was very concerned. That was during her short tenure as governor. She was an Ogden native, so she was very concerned about this. In fact, I had her up to lunch in my office one day and the sole purpose was, "General Sullivan, what do you think?" 18 I told her, “I don't think much, and I don't think that we're vulnerable. I don't think that there's a problem with Hill closing.” Obviously, you could never guarantee that. There was a healthy concern, but it wasn't like '95, and the community members knew that. Governor Walker wasn't as close to it as the UDA folks were, so she didn't have the same understanding. She was concerned. But I think after we talked, I think she was fine. But the local community wasn't as concerned. But they can tell you better what they did. AK: Okay, so more a question for UDA maybe? KS: Sure. They had a new congressman. Bishop was new at the time, so they didn't have Jim Hansen. That might have concerned them some. They still had Orrin Hatch. AK: I remember Ernie Parada was mentioning something about LOGSTAR and their involvement in supporting the base. Did they have any part in any—? KS: Not really. The LOGSTAR program was more of a social and exposure program. We would have community members recommended to us or we would pick community members. Typically, they were people in the LOGSTAR program that didn't have a lot of familiarity with the base. The goal was to familiarize them with the base. We did a lot of social things with them. I don't recall much in the way of mission briefings. I mean, we brought them on tours, but it was really more of an exposure thing. These were not UDA people. UDA people were people that might have been LOGSTARS ten years ago and had been in and stayed involved with the 19 base for ten years. For the most part, UDA people were people that understood the base. These were community members who we felt it would be worth our while to expose them to the base and kind of generate that community support for the base. So, I don't recall anything we did specifically with the LOGSTARS at the time. We may have talked about BRAC, but it certainly wasn't a focus item that we were trying to co-opt these LOGSTARS as supporters. Think honorary commander today. The LOGSTAR program is no longer, it's an honorary commander is what it is. It's largely social. AK: That makes sense, okay. So, it's helpful, but not to the degree that UDA is. KS: No. These by design would not be people who were very familiar with the base. Whereas with UDA, you want people that have a familiarization with the base who understand what's going on out there, who can interact with elected officials and all. AK: Kind of help with lobbying efforts? KS: Right. AK: That's a good thing to know. During 2005 BRAC, I know it wasn't as big of a community concern as 1995, but were you ever asked to be on any kind of radio show or TV shows, talk to the community? KS: No, not relative to BRAC, I don't believe so. I didn't always run to my legal office, but I probably would have run to my legal office and said, “What do you think?” But my sense was I would have done it, just would have been limited to what I could say. 20 AK: I was just asking because I know General Condon had been on the KLO radio show with Len Allen in BRAC '95. KS: Yeah. I don't recall in 2005 doing any. We may have had a news conference. But it might have been just to say what happened, but there was no interview type program that I was on. AK: Not as much of a need to calm nerves, or kind of help the community and such? KS: Once again, different environment in 2005. AK: Backing up a little bit to 2003, during a Commander's Call, you said, "BRAC isn't something that's being done to us, it is something we are doing for ourselves." Why did you want your workers to have that kind of attitude? KS: I'm curious as to how you would know I said that? [Laughs] AK: Research [laughs]. I go through the different Hill Air Force Base newspapers. KS: Sure. You know, I guess just to place blame where it belonged. I think there was a sentiment that this was something that Congress was doing to us, and it wasn't. The Department of Defense requested the BRAC and I think I was just trying to make sure they understood who they ought to be mad at, who they ought to blame, because it wasn't it wasn't Congress. It was the Department of Defense who said we have excess infrastructure and we need to close some. The BRAC process, obviously, is a congressionally mandated process. The process may be congressionally directed, but the request for the BRAC comes from the Department of Defense. I think I was just trying to make sure they understood who to blame if they wanted to blame somebody. 21 AK: I like that you said it's something that we're doing for ourselves, and I probably should have added the rest of what you said about how this is something to help keep the Air Force viable. Do you feel like a lot of the workers, did they have that attitude? Or were they still really concerned? KS: They were concerned. Let's face it, it's an annoyance. If I had to say that over again, I'm not sure I would say it the same way, because I'm not totally convinced that the Department of Defense has gotten what they thought they were going to get out of their BRAC process. There are some GAO studies out there, and I'm not sure the anxiety and the angst that we put our employees through and we put our communities through are worth what we've saved in terms of dollars, certainly not in 2005. 2005 was largely a realignment exercise and so it saved damn little. I'm not as convinced as I might have been in 2003 when I was much younger and on active duty. I'm not as convinced that BRAC has been as useful to the department as the department would like it to have been. It puts communities through a ringer. The only one that benefits typically are consultants that communities bring in and pay to help them work BRAC. So, I believed that at the time when I said it, but I'm not as sanguine about the value of BRAC as I used to be. Maybe it's because I'm in the community now. AK: That's fair. Well, you said something interesting just now that I'm curious to follow up on. You mentioned that the anxiety and angst from the community was a part of the reason why you feel like BRAC wasn't worth it. Why is that? What's the importance to the community not feeling that anxiety? 22 KS: Well, Hill's probably a better example than a lot of places. Military installations exist in the communities in which they're hosted and what you hope for is a good relationship between the base and the community, particularly in a base like Hill with so many civilians. I know we have a big fence around the base, but it's almost hard to determine where the boundary of Hill starts and ends, and the boundary of the community starts and ends. It's hard to talk to someone in the community that doesn't know somebody or have a relative that hasn't worked at Hill Air Force Base at some time in their life. We are so intertwined. We get our electricity from the same places. We get our water from the same places. Our kids go to the same schools, and we go to the same churches. It's almost not fair to put that civilian portion of that community through the kinds of things you put them through with a BRAC. Getting back to Hill in particular, if Hill Air Force Base were to close, Davis County and Weber County would be a mess. I mean, we're talking 6.7 billion dollars a year in economic impact that comes out of Hill Air Force Base. For the northern Utah economy, that's huge. It's the largest single-site employer in the state, and to think what we put the community through in 1995. I mean, it was horrific for people. Not everybody understands that, but the people that understand, understand what could have happened if Hill closed. Ultimately the community might have recovered in 20 or 30 years. But do you want to go through that 20- or 30-year period of depression? No, so BRAC puts communities through a lot of angst, particularly communities like this, with huge numbers of civilians. In a base like Hill, in every state in which a big base 23 exists, it is an economic driver for the state. I don't care what state it is, but these big bases are just economic drivers for the states and the communities in which they exist. So, why put communities through that kind of mess, for I don't know, a billion dollars a year in the overall scheme of things? That's not a lot of money in this country anymore. AK: Yeah, that's true. So, the economic side aside, do you feel like the interconnectedness that Hill Air Force Base has with Utah, is that pretty unique to Hill Air Force Base? KS: I would say it's unique to bases like Hill. All bases strive to be contributing members of their community, to be good neighbors. But when you have a base like Hill with, I don't know what we've got out there, 13,000 DOD civilians, another several thousand contractors who live in the community and a relatively small military population, the connections are just so much greater than if you have a regular Air Force base, which is predominantly military. They turn over every couple of years. It's a little bit different. A base like Hill is just so connected into the community because of that, the large civilian employee population and the large contractor population who are also part of our community. AK: This is probably not a fair question, but do you happen to know the percentage of civilian workers versus Air Force workers at Hill? KS: Yeah, I should know that. It depends on where you are. In the Air Logistics Center, it's probably 90 percent, 95 percent. I guess there's probably three or four thousand military members out there out of about 20,000 workers, most of which are Air Force civilians, but some of which are contractors. So pretty small. 24 AK: Talking about civilian workers and also independent contractor workers. This is probably an odd question, but do you feel like the base realignment and closure rounds maybe benefited the defense contractor businesses more than the military? KS: I'm sorry, the closure? AK: Yeah. I was thinking I know a lot of people from McClellan, for instance, if they didn't want to move, they would go and work for the nearest defense contractor as opposed to a base installation. I don't know how separate they are, but do you feel like that maybe benefited Boeing or Northrop Grumman? KS: I don't think so. The other reality is when McClellan closes, all those defense contractors go somewhere else. They come to Hill and they go to Wright Patterson and they go to Tinker in Oklahoma. In most cases, those contractors are there because of the base. So, I don't think that would have had any impact on it. I still think that our civilian employees on base are pretty safe in their jobs. I mean, there's a lot of safety, I think, in being a Department of Defense civilian. So, I don't think that would have impacted that at all. AK: Okay. Another quote from your email to Guy: You said, "In terms of supporting the viability of the missions of the base, to include its very existence, I believe the community engagement in those areas began with the formation of Hill/DDO'95 in 1993 and continues today through UDA and MIDA." I was wondering if you could expand on that a little more. How did Hill/DDO'95 begin a greater amount of community engagement? Do we still see that today? 25 KS: I think if not greater, at least a different kind. I think up until ‘93, the engagement with the base in the community was predominantly social, a lot of golf activities, a lot of dinner activities, a lot of party activities. It was social and it was a quality of life related. Maybe providing gift baskets for various annual awards banquets and those types of things. It was more along the lines of social, it was along the lines of quality of life, "Let's take care of our airmen" kinds of things. What Hill/DDO'93 started was an understanding that the mission of the base is really important and absent the ability of the people on base to carry out their mission, there is no base. UDA and its predecessor organizations are focused on the mission. They're focused on sustaining the viability of the mission on the base and whether that has to do with buying up land so you don't have encroachment issues, whether it has to do with working within the Department of Defense to try to keep missions there, and working with the delegation to try to bring more missions in. It's an expanded involvement with the base, and I think it means more involvement, too. But to focus on the mission of the base and the viability of the base, where I don't think that was an issue before ’93, ‘95. I think there was an assessment that the base would always be there. I mean it's always been there, you know, since the 1940s. It was always going to be there, and the mission of the base, that was the Air Force's business. But I think beginning with those closure rounds, all of a sudden the community decided, “That's our business, too, because it's our base, it's an economic driver 26 in our community, and it may not be there forever. So, we need to do what we can do to help keep it there.” I think that was the big change that we saw probably beginning in ‘93 as we were approaching ‘95, and there was a recognition that maybe Hill won't be there forever. I think that was the big change. Even today, the top of the Utah Military Affairs Committee focuses on quality of life. They do a big picnic out at the base every year, they provide gift baskets for annual awards banquets. We've provided money for their Airman's Recreation Center, and that's all good, but UDA continues to focus on mission viability. AK: We were talking about how the Military Affairs Committee is more concerned with quality of life, whereas UDA has a lot more of the viability of the base at its core. So how does UDA work with the Air Force in order to lobby for different work and such? KS: A couple of different ways, I guess. We will make a trip to visit Air Force leadership every year, maybe every other year. We'll go in and visit the chief of staff of the Air Force, the various deputy chiefs of staff that have responsibilities for areas that we're interested in. We'll do the same in the Army. We do the same kinds of things for Dugway and Tooele and the National Guard that we do for Hill. Hill will always be the big dog, but we do the same thing for the other organizations as well. We go in and meet with them periodically and just lay out our concerns or lay out the things that we're interested in. We also do it through an organization called the Association of Defense Communities. UDA has been a member of that 27 for many years now. When we don't have COVID issues, they do large national conventions several times a year. We use those opportunities, because the Air Force and the other services will also send senior leaders into those events, and we will have offline discussions there for items that we're interested in within the services. We have a DC-based consultant that we use as well who is pretty well connected into the Air Force. In cases where we may not be able to make a trip, we will ask them to interface with the Air Force for us. We also have membership on the chief of staff of the Air Force's Civic Leader Program, Vicki McCall and Tage Flint are both members of that. We have membership on the Air Combat Command Senior Civic Leader Group. That's Vicki McCall and Steve Rush. We have membership on the Air Force Materiel Command Senior Leader Group. That's Steve Rush and it used to be Jerry Stevenson, but I'm not sure who else is on it now. But Steve from UDA for sure. We're trying to get Tage Flint on the Air Mobility Command civic leaders group. We don't lobby through those groups. I mean, that's not their job. In fact, they're specifically asked not to lobby for their location. But what it does is it gives us a lot of insight. It gives us a lot of access to knowledge that we wouldn't normally have. So, we do it through a number of different ways. Then we bring in a bunch of old retired guys, like Pat Condon and me, who have some understanding of how the base works and may still have a few contacts around the world. That’s how we work, the Air Force, the Department of Defense piece. AK: Tage Flint was also mentioning that you help him with the military lingo and such. 28 KS: Well, I'm a translator as much as anything. I do some translation for him AK: That's what he was saying. That's so funny. You mentioned that people who are honorary commanders aren't allowed to lobby for their own departments? KS: Typically. Tage and Vickie could talk to you more about that than I can. But that's not their job. Their job basically is to learn, to understand, to be advocates in their community. But I think they're pretty much asked, “Don't be a lobbyist for your base. We don't expect you to come in here and lobby the chief of staff of the Air Force on behalf of Hill Air Force Base or lobby the commander of Air Combat Command on behalf of Hill Air Force Base. That's not your job.” In some cases, they will ask them to lobby on behalf of the Air Force, but what it provides is information. It provides access to some of those staffs to just ask questions, but they don't want them lobbying. We do our lobbying elsewhere. When we go do our fly-ins, we'll do lobbying then. We'll ask our DC-based consultant to lobby for us. That's kind of how we work with the departments. That's important. We are pretty well connected. I think one of the strengths of the Utah Defense Alliance is how well we're connected inside the Air Force in particular. Not so well in the Army, and not at all in the Navy, but very well connected inside the Air Force, and I think that's helpful. Even more connected now through our consultants in D.C. AK: So, when we interviewed Rob Bishop, he mentioned a little bit about getting the F-35 to Hill Air Force Base. Did UDA have a hand in lobbying for that? 29 KS: You know, that was a little before my time. Yes, probably. I think what UDA did most of all is when they had their town hall sessions, when the program office or the Air Force did their town hall sessions, UDA was there in force and made sure that the right people were talking. Obviously, they didn't preclude anyone else from talking that didn't want the F-35 here, but those were very positive sessions. Some of the other things that UDA did over the years was some of the work they've done to preclude encroachment, particularly off the south end of the runway. Not necessarily directly F-35 related, but the fact that we don't have much encroachment at Hill is a big deal for the F-35 when they're making those basing decisions. Frankly, Hill was the logical place to put the first F-35 unit. Hill was the first active F-16 base. The F-35 is largely a replacement for the F-16. It just kind of made sense historically to put the F-35 here. But I would say it's the things that UDA did to keep encroachment to a minimum and to keep Hill viable over the years that made them a candidate for the F-35 as opposed to any near-term lobbying they did to get the F-35 here. I'm sure Bishop's office was involved, and I'm sure Hatch's office was involved in some amount of lobbying. But to me, it just made sense it was the right place to put the first F-35 base. AK: I would assume with how many people are moving into Northern Utah that UDA is still involved in making sure there's no encroachment on the base? KS: It's called a Compatible Use Plan study that's ongoing right now. Layton City is the executive agent for us for it, but it involves all of the towns and cities surrounding Hill Air Force Base. What they're doing right now is they'll develop a 30 plan that UDA and the cities around the base will then have to go execute that talks to what kinds of compatible use can you have around Hill Air Force Base. So, instead of saying you can't have anything off the south end of the runway, maybe you can have agriculture out there. Maybe Jerry Stevenson can move JJ Nursery up there and grow trees there because it's minimal human involvement from airplane crashes. You know, you'll trash some of Jerry's trees, but that'll be the end of it. That's the kind of thing it's looking at all around the base. It'll look at noise issues, it’ll look at airfield issues, it'll look at transportation issues. For example, what's going to happen to the Roy Gate now that we've got 4000 Northrop Grumman people there? What's going to happen to the Roy Gate and that 5600 interchange? It'll look at those kinds of things. Then the cities and towns around the base will have to figure out what we're going to do with that plan. So, those kinds of things continuing, those kinds of things are important for the base. AK: You mentioned that you became a UDA director in 2011, and then you became the executive director in January 2013. What brought you back to Ogden after you retired from the Air Force? KS: Skiing and friends, and the fact that we didn't have another place we needed to be. When we came back here in 2009, neither of my sons were married and I had no grandchildren, so there was no draw elsewhere. Now I have one married son and two granddaughters, so I now have a house in Ohio, which is where both my sons live. So really, there was no pull anywhere else. We'd had good 31 friends out here, we'd been stationed here twice, and I was still skiing at the time. That's kind of why we came back. We liked the area. AK: Then what got you involved in the Utah Defense Alliance? KS: I think what got me involved, because I wasn't involved as soon as I got back, I think what got me involved was there was some congressional language that had been introduced that would have had an impact on Hill. I won't bore you with what it was. But there was some congressional language that would have negatively impacted the three bases that have Air Logistics complexes on them now, Robins Air Force Base in Georgia and Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, and here. The civic leaders from those three areas got together to see what we could do about changing that language. Candidly, and I don't want this to sound wrong, but there wasn't anyone on UDA that really had knowledge of that at the time. I did. So, I think that's what got me pulled back into UDA, was trips to Washington, D.C., working with the other community members and the staffers from the three delegations to kind of put together a plan to try to reverse this language that was potentially detrimental to the Air Logistics Complexes. I think that's why I got pulled back into UDA. That's not uncommon. We tend to bring people in that have some knowledge that we can use in UDA. I had the freshest knowledge in this area of the issues associated with that change in law, so I think that's what got me involved. Pat Condon and I went back and forth to D.C. two or three times, working with other community members, other community leaders, and staffers 32 to try to get that changed because we thought it would be detrimental to the Air Logistics Complexes—or "Centers" at the time. AK: Then once you're involved, you decide to continue with UDA? KS: Well actually, what happened was, the executive director at the time was a guy named Rick Mayfield and Rick left. Rick went on a hardship mission to Hawaii, as I recall. I think his wife actually was sent there and he went there on a mission. But they were without an executive director and that's why I ended up with the executive director job. I really didn't want to do it, to be honest with you. I didn't want to get that engaged. But it turned out to be pretty fun. AK: And here you are, still the executive director. KS: Right. AK: Okay. Before we wrap, is there anything else that you want to touch on that I didn't cover? KS: I'd encourage you guys to take a look at the BRAC criteria if you haven't, and kind of understand why I think the base stayed open in '95. The community did all the right things with UDA, with establishing Hill/DDO'95, but I think the base stayed open on its own merit. I think since then, UDA has done a number of different things that may have been more important for the base's longevity than what they did in ‘93, ‘95. Because I think in ‘95, well, let's face it, we had no political clout at all whatsoever. If it was a political decision, we were going to lose. Thank God it wasn't a political decision. It was, I think, a decision based on merit, based on the criteria, and Hill stayed open. 33 But there have been a number of things since then that probably were less visible to the community where I think Utah Defense Alliance has done some good things that have been really valuable to Hill Air Force Base, maybe more valuable than actually what was done in ’95. But it was that ‘95 scare that kicked things off. I think it would be worthwhile to understand the criteria and then maybe to understand some of the things that have occurred since then that I think have been important to maintain the viability of the base since then. AK: What were some of those things? KS: This language we got reversed in, I don't know, 2011, 2012 timeframe was important. It could have had an impact on the amount of work that was coming to places like Hill. It could have diverted some of that work into the private sector based on that language. We didn't want that. When Air Force Materiel Command was reorganized in 2013, they wanted to do some things that would have been really detrimental to Hill. They wanted to take away all the general officers from Hill. We got that reversed. They wanted to stop sending program management work to places like Hill. We got that reversed, working through Senator Hatch's office. Those kinds of things could have had long term impacts. While I was still on active duty, there was apparently an intention to move the 388th fighter wing out of Hill. Had that occurred, that could have made Hill more vulnerable. UDA worked to get that stopped through, I think, Congressman Hansen's office. Vicki and Steve would be more in tune to that. 34 But I just think there's a number of different things that have occurred that probably occurred well below the radar that the community wouldn't have even been aware of that have been really helpful to keep that base viable over the years. I think that's been the true value of Utah Defense Alliance. BRAC '95 got it started, but I think since then it's done a lot of good that people will never understand because it's been done below the radar, because there wasn't this huge threat to the base and to the community. It was just a nick here and a nick there that all of a sudden could have meant something. AK: You mentioned in 2011 there was some language that got reversed? KS: Yeah, it had to do with something called core workload, and they wanted to change the definitions of core workload. Core workload is workload that is determined that you have to retain organically in a depot essentially in case we have some sort of an emergency, maybe we go to war. So, you have to maintain certain skills organically because we can ramp that up pretty quickly. That's what Core has to do with. It’s workload that's been determined that you need to maintain a capability to do within the Department of Defense. There was an attempt to change the definition of that, which would have allowed more of that workload to go outside the Department of Defense. It's pretty arcane language and like I said, most people wouldn't understand it. I think some of the people that wrote it don't understand it. But it could have had, we believed, some bad impacts on Hill, just like some of the reorganization activities could have had some bad impacts on Hill, which we were able to mitigate through our involvement with the delegation. 35 I spent weeks on the phone with staff, with Hatch's office, and his office was on the phone with the secretary of the Air Force's office regularly in order to try to get some of these things changed. The fact that we have this Enhanced Use Lease thing on the west side of the base that MIDA runs is really important to the long-term viability of Hill. Once again, things that people in the community wouldn't normally be involved in. AK: Was that core workload related to the Core Plus workload in 1995? KS: I'm sorry? AK: Let me give a little more context: With some of the newspaper research I've been doing, I read about how after BRAC 1995, they started something called the Core Plus program, which helped with some of the workload transitions. Do you know if that's—? KS: I don't know if that's related to what I was talking about or not. It could be. I just don't know. I'm not familiar with that. AK: I asked Ernie Parada about it, he made it seem like it was similar to this core workload that had to do with how much workload we needed in times of peace verses in times of war— KS: It could have been. There are two things in statute that kind of ensure not too much work is moved to the private sector: One is this core workload which you identify by weapons system, the kinds of work you need to keep inside the Air Force or inside the Department of Defense. You do it in terms of hours, as I recall; how many hours do you need to keep in. The other thing is something called 50/50, and what that says is that 50 percent of the depot maintenance 36 work—and I think this is in man hours or dollars, I'm not sure which—has to be done organically. There's a report to Congress every year that looks at how much work is done in the private sector, how much work is done inside the Department of Defense, and if it's less than 50 percent that's done inside the Department of Defense, then there's all sorts of nasty reporting requirements from the secretary of the Air Force or Navy or Army. Whoever is in violation gets to go talk to Congress and explain why they've done this terrible thing. But those kinds of things are important for keeping that work in the government. There's other things. I mean, last year there was some language that was put in regarding the definition of commercial items and how that's all managed. We managed to get that turned around because there was some language that we felt would be detrimental to the ALC. So, it's just kind of constantly keeping your eye on some of the statutory work that's done. If you miss that, the next thing you know, the law changes, and, you know, it's kind of like a 1.9 trillion-dollar COVID bill that includes a bridge from New York to Canada. I mean, if you don't watch that kind of stuff closely, you end up putting a one and a half billion-dollar bridge to Canada from New York in the COVID package. That's kind of what happens in Congress. AK: That is something I had not heard of [laughs]. That makes sense, though. Thank you. Anything else you want to cover before we wrap up? KS: I don't think so. I'm a real believer in what UDA does. I think we do it better than just about anybody. We've had multiple conversations with multiple other states 37 to try to pattern how UDA does things. But it took 25 years to get where we are. A lot of that is just 25 years of people like Vickie and Tage and Steve that have been doing this for a long time. We've kind of evolved to what we are today. But UDA does it as well as anybody. AK: Was UDA basically the first of its kind? KS: You know, I don't know that it was the first. I'm sure there are others out there. I think it was a little bit unique in a couple of different ways. One, it was unique in how well they were able to get into these civic leader programs, which I think is important. It's unique in our funding. Our funding largely comes from the state. It's unique in that when UDA started, we were about the only organization in the state that did what we do. There's now a Department of Military and Veterans Affairs in the governor's office. It used to be just the Department of Veterans Affairs. They were interested in the military piece for about the past seven years when they changed the name and changed the focus. So, there's now a government governor's cabinet position. He's also one of our vice presidents, but that's involved in this kind of thing. But for a long time, UDA was kind of the only organization in the state, with the possible exception of GOED, that was really looking out for the military piece. The fact that we've had people with it as long as they have has made a difference. AK: I just have a couple of things and then we can wrap up. KS: Sure. 38 AK: I feel like you kind of already answered this, but I'll just ask anyway. What do you feel is the lasting legacy of BRAC 1995 and 2005 on both the base and also on the Utah community? KS: Well, Hill is now one of three Air Logistics Complexes. We changed the name, in the Air Force, and I think that's about as low as you can go. I think that it proves that Hill's a survivor. I don't see that there's a—and certainly in UDA—we don't see that there's a huge threat to Hill Air Force base anymore closing. We think we're about where we need to be in terms of Air Logistics Centers. It also resulted in additional work at the base. From a base standpoint, I think it just kind of rounded out their workload. I think it's kind of workloaded them to the point where they're about where they need to be workload-wise. From the community standpoint, I think the lasting legacy is probably UDA and I think an understanding that you really can't take the base for granted. It may not be there always. There are things that the state can do and the community can do to help ensure that it stays there, assuming the state and the community want it there. I think it gave the state a different appreciation for the base and a different understanding of maybe the state has a part in trying to keep the base there as well. Of course, UDA and MIDA are both really offshoots of the Hill/DDO'95 activity that I think have been good for the base long term. AK: From a UDA standpoint, do you feel like the community is as aware or concerned about the impact of the base on Utah? KS: We try to make it. I mean, obviously you don't have the huge community concern that you had in ’95, and we hope we never have that again. But I do think there 39 may be a better understanding of the value of Hill Air Force Base. UDA published an economic impact study a couple of years ago that we've just updated, trying to help quantify what that is. That's where the $6.7 billion comes from in economic impact. But in general, the community isn't as attuned as they were in ‘95. But I do think that the Utah Defense Alliance is probably more active now in many ways than we have ever been. Obviously not as much as we were in ‘95, but UDA stays very active both with Hill and we've expanded our reach to Dugway and to Tooele and the Utah National Guard. I think from our standpoint, we're probably as engaged now as we've ever been in Hill and the other military installations in the state. AK: How can the community continue to support Hill Air Force Base? KS: Be good neighbors, continue to do the things the community does. It's a welcoming community. They welcome our military members into the area when they come. We can build more houses. UDA is doing a study right now on trying to capture the growth potential at Hill and in the surrounding contractor communities and then sharing that with the local mayors. We don't think they understand the growth that's coming at Hill. So more affordable housing. Transportation. We need to fix that 5600 South Interstate 15 interchange at the Roy gate. We need to build that 1800 North interchange into Sunset. One thing the state did this year is, I think we're going to exempt military retired pay from Utah state tax. Which, in addition to benefiting old guys like me, might enable us to attract more military retirees to the area who are very attractive to people like Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Lockheed Martin as 40 employees, because they have security clearances, they understand the business, they understand the language. So, we're hoping that that helps. Then the whole encroachment, compatible use, land use around the base is important and around the range, which is getting a little more encroachment than it has in the past. But the range is important too. When you talk about Hill Air Force Base, you really can't divorce Hill from the range because it's so important to people like the 388th who use it. AK: This is the Utah Test and Training Range? KS: Yes. We think it's going to be the Bishop Utah Test and Training Range. Congressman Stewart has submitted a bill, so it'll be the BUTTR, I guess, instead of the UTTR. I don't know. But it would be a nice gesture for Congressman Bishop. So, yeah, infrastructure around the base I think in general is really important. Water, electricity, I mean, those kinds of things. AK: Awesome. Thank you so much. We really appreciate your time KS: Sure, and good luck. 41