Oral History Program Lester Lyles Interviewed by Sarah Langsdon 22 December 2020 Oral History Program Weber State University Stewart Library Ogden, Utah Lester Lyles Interviewed by Sarah Langsdon 22 December 2020 Copyright © 2025 by Weber State University, Stewart Library Mission Statement The Oral History Program of the Stewart Library was created to preserve the institutional history of Weber State University and the Davis, Ogden and Weber County communities. By conducting carefully researched, recorded, and transcribed interviews, the Oral History Program creates archival oral histories intended for the widest possible use. Interviews are conducted with the goal of eliciting from each participant a full and accurate account of events. The interviews are transcribed, edited for accuracy and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewees (as available), who are encouraged to augment or correct their spoken words. The reviewed and corrected transcripts are indexed, printed, and bound with photographs and illustrative materials as available. The working files, original recording, and archival copies are housed in the University Archives. Project Description The Hill/DDO’95 oral history project documents the 1995 and 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process and its impact on Utah. In 1993, rumors started to circulate that Hill Air Force Base and Defense Depot Ogden (DDO) would be closed by the 1995 round of BRAC, causing state officials, local government, and local grassroots lobbying group, Hill/DDO’95, to spring into action to save Utah’s military installations from closure or realignment to other facilities. This project includes interviews from a wide range of players, from congressmen, state officials, members of Hill/DDO’95, and the civilian employees of Hill Air Force Base and (DDO). Their accounts describe the process of fighting for the base, the closure of DDO, the formation of the Utah Defense Alliance (UDA) and Military Installation Development Authority (MIDA) from the Hill/DDO’95 group, and their fight to save Hill Air Force Base all over again in 2005. Also discussed is the importance of the F-35 aircraft and the “Falcon Hill” Enhanced Use Lease project to the prosperity of Hill Air Force Base and military relations in Utah. ____________________________________ Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account. It reflects personal opinion offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable. ____________________________________ Rights Management This work is the property of the Weber State University, Stewart Library Oral History Program. It may be used freely by individuals for research, teaching and personal use as long as this statement of availability is included in the text. It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows: Lyles, Lester, an oral history by Sarah Langsdon, 22 December 2020, WSU Stewart Library Oral History Program, University Archives, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden, UT. iii Abstract: This is an oral history interview with Lester Lyles. It was conducted on December 22, 2020 through Zoom. Lyles recalls his experiences as the commander of the Ogden Air Logistics Center during the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure. He recalls the complexities of the 1995 round and his efforts to support community “Save the Base” efforts while staying supportive of the ultimate BRAC decision. The interviewer is Sarah Langsdon. Also in the room is Alyssa Kammerman. SL: This is Sarah Langsdon, I am here with General Lester Lyles. It is December 22, 2020. Also with me in my office is Alyssa Kammerman, and we're going to be talking to General Lyles today about Hill Air Force Base and BRAC 1993 and 1995. So, you came to Ogden in you said July of 1992 as Vice Commander, correct? LL: Yes. SL: Were you involved in the 1993 BRAC round? LL: Yes, because obviously being both a Vice Commander and then in 1993, I became the Commander of Ogden Air Logistics Center. So, yes, I was involved in the 1993 BRAC round. SL: What was the 1993 BRAC round like? LL: Well, like all the BRAC initiatives, they're all designed to take a look at bases to determine, at large, which ones potentially could be shut down or closed, which ones could be realigned—obviously, that's what the R stands for in BRAC—and which workload at each one of those bases, for all the services, potentially could be the subject of either a realignment or a closure. SL: Okay, so was Hill on the agenda, on the docket, for 1993, or was it just 1995? LL: Theoretically, every base is on the agenda for BRAC rounds. So, Hill and all the logistics centers for the United States Air Force, and the logistics activities for the Army and the Navy, are also potentially candidates to be closed. Usually in BRAC, I think sometimes they identify some candidate bases that they specifically want to 1 look at. But as I recall it, the congressional law that established BRAC was to look at every potential base, not just select ones. So, long way to answer your question, yes, Hill and every other base as part of the Air Force and the activities were looked at. SL: Okay. When we were doing some research, Alyssa found an article in the Hilltop Times where you stated that you regretted not taking a more active approach in saving the tactical mission repair jobs that you lost in BRAC of 1993. Do you view the 1993 BRAC as a turning point for you, and others at Hill Air Force Base, to handle future rounds? LL: Well, first, if I had known that Alyssa some seventeen years later, was going to find that article, I probably wouldn't have said that. So, Alyssa, were you even born in 1993? AK: I was. I look really young, but I was. LL: Okay, just checking. In all honesty, Sarah, I think every organization learns from going through BRAC rounds. Whether they are victorious or not, they learn from it. I guess my message was we learned a lesson perhaps in terms, at Hill, of making sure we don't take it for granted that we are so excellent in all the workload we have that we couldn't be either the subject or victims, if you will, of a potential closure or realignment. I also don't think that we, again this is not a pejorative statement, I don't think we really understood how aggressive some of the other organizations, particularly Army in their Letterkenny facility, would look at some of the workload that we had, and covered it, and fight to try to get it to their facility. So, it was a more of a statement of fact that we learn from that. Yes, we did apply lessons we learned from that BRAC round to the activities in 1995. AK: So, first of all, sorry, that was not meant to be an accusatory question. LL: Oh it's fine. I know that. 2 AK: I was also wondering, we have interviewed one of the community members recently who mentioned that the military allowed you to be more involved in the 1993 round. Then in the 1995 round they said, "No, no military involvements, only community involvement," in trying to save the bases. I was curious what you were allowed to do in the 1993 round and how it affected the way that you approached the 1995 round since, like I said, you weren't allowed to do as much in trying to save the base. If that makes sense. LL: Yeah, you captured it perfectly and accurately. Yes, there were more stringent restrictions on the part of military people and leaders, if you will, to stay neutral and try to protect their bases. I mean, that's sort of a natural thing, to try to protect the workload and the activities at your particular base. But I guess, somewhere people thought there was a little bit too much of that, too much politicking and other things going on in 1993. So, there were very, very stringent restrictions on what you could and could not do, in both talking to, engaging, marketing, if I could use a term, to the members of the BRAC Commission or trying to get others, like politicians do, to market to them. Theoretically, BRAC is supposed to be a diagnostic process, if you will, to go through, look at the workload, look at the quality of the work, look at the opportunities for either closing something or realigning something, and then letting the BRAC commissioners make the recommendation without any interference of politics. Now, we all know that's not pure. Politics always play a part. Yes, there were restrictions on things. But we tried to walk a fine line, a very fine line, to make sure we still told the story as accurately as we could about the workload at Hill Air Force Base, the quality of the work at Hill Air Force Base, the quality of the workforce, particularly at Hill, and the impact to the community, and then we 3 depended on the community to speak up for themselves about what the impact would be to the economy, etcetera, if something were to leave. By the way, let me just add. One of the other things, and this is another lesson learned, very forthright in defining what you wrote about your workload. I will never forget—I thought it was very, well I didn't think was funny at the time, it was funny afterwards. Reading through the descriptor of some of the other Air Force bases, and particularly other logistics centers. Now, obviously, you have the Great Salt Lake here, and while the Great Salt Lake is not a beach per say, it was amazing how one of the other facilities, an Air Force facility where there is a logistics center, and I won't name names, took credit in their write-up for having a beach nearby the base. I knew that was probably a small hole somewhere, certainly nothing as expansive as the Great Salt Lake. We were being very honest. We didn't put down that we had a beach in the descriptor of the facilities, of lakes around the base. So, it's another lesson learned. You have to make sure that you're honest to a fault, but you're also making sure you're saying things that will enhance the view of the base to somebody who's not familiar with it. AK: So, one of the things I was noticing in my research was that everybody seems to observe that BRAC 1995 was going to be more intense. That was something that was talked about quite a bit, that 1993 was going to be nothing compared to what 1995 was going to be. Was there something that maybe tipped you off to that or—? I'm just curious why that was something that you, as well as others, were saying? LL: Well, I think, Alyssa, it was probably related to the comment about the greater restrictions. As I recall, there were complaints and concerns from Congress, and from different communities around the country about how accurate and nonpolitical the process is supposed to be, but how politics and marketing and all those things came into play. So, just the fact that there were restrictions on what you can and 4 can't say, and what leaders at the base could and could not do, was an obvious indicator that this was going to be a lot more strict, a lot more stringent, and a lot tougher. Even that very somewhat humorous anecdote about the beach, you had to make sure you said things that were not lies, obviously, but said things that really enhanced your chances of being able to stay, or not being realigned, or not losing the workload. It was nothing other than the fact that the more stringent restrictions was a clear indicator this is going to be tougher. SL: Interesting. AK: That makes sense. Did BRAC 1993 also evaluate the Air Logistics Centers or was that more of a 1995 thing? LL: No, it also examined the Air Logistics Centers. Now, the ALC didn't seem to be touched as much, I don't recall, in that 1993, but I know they looked at them. I'm trying to remember; this is really a test because I didn't go back and check the history. There were originally, as you may have found in history, there were five logistics centers or facilities for the United States Air Force. That ended up becoming three, obviously, down at Warner Robins in Georgia, and Tinker in Oklahoma City, and then Hill Air Force Base. But what I don't remember is if the other two, Sacramento and Kelly, I think they were touched in 1995, not in 1993. SL: They both closed in 1995. LL: 1995. By the way, because a base is closed during a particular BRAC, just the process by which communities and organizations move the workload, determine whether or not a facility can be used by the community, etcetera, the actual closure for Sacramento, McClellan Air Force Base, and Kelley in San Antonio, didn't take place until I think it was 2000, 2001, so several years later. Of course, by then I was the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command, so I had the dubious honor of officiating at the ceremonies at those places to close the facilities. That really is eye 5 opening, when you see literally thousands of people who have given their lives or working at a facility and the community leaders lose their jobs. You see both the good, bad, and the ugly. The good is how well some of them took it. The bad is just the fact that workload left that particular activity. SL: What was the significance of interservice work? A lot of the newspaper accounts were talking about how important it was in 1993, 1995 to take on interservice work, and so we were just wondering what the significance of that was. LL: Well, Congress put a major push, and it was related to BRAC, and actually even separate from BRAC for that matter, a major push on what they call a depot competition because there are similarity in workload. For instance, like the missile repair that you mentioned, and what goes on at places like Letterkenny, I think is how it's pronounced, for the Army, because there's munitions work that we did and the Army also did, and obviously air work done by us in places like maybe North Island, outside of San Diego. It's a big push from Congress to have competition amongst the various service workloads and service activities to see if there is an opportunity, short of a BRAC, to actually combine, realign, or move workload from one facility to another, with the interests of saving money and saving manpower. So, that was a big, big push from Congress to have depot competitions. AK: So, was it mainly based in depot work or was it also the work that was actually on base? Because obviously, Defense Depot Ogden closed, and so I was wondering if there was some interservice work on base? I don't know if that would be Materiel Command or Air Logistics Center that would be involved in that? LL: No, and Alyssa, I don't recall for sure. I think they looked at competition mostly with depots or depot-related work. The one you mentioned was not necessarily on the base, per se, but it was related to it. I think that we had oversight at the base, at the ALC for some of the other activity in Ogden. It was called depot competition, so it 6 was really depot and logistic facilities across the Department of Defense. As I recall, there were some situations where commercial industry had a chance to be involved. I say that because one of the obvious workloads that we had at Ogden at the Hill Air Force Base was doing repair for landing gear. One of the particular competitors that we ended up going against was, I think it was Goodyear and their landing gear work, some of which took place, I think, in Canada. But there was competition looking at that also as part of the depot competition. SL: So not only are you competing against other depots in the military, you're also competing against private industry? LL: Competing against depots in your own service, depots and facilities in other services, and there was at least one dealing with landing gear where there was a look at whether or not that could be done elsewhere other than at a military facility. SL: Wow, that's quite a lot of competition for a job. LL: Yes, but all the objective is trying to do is use competition to reduce the costs and manpower and facilities of doing things in the Department of Defense. AK: Was that part of privatizing the work? LL: Yes, privatizing it. SL: What was the significance of the Navy F/A-18 contract for Hill Air Force Base? LL: Well, that was the major one for us relative to depot competition. We literally, because of that, we competed against Navy North Island to do the depot maintenance work for the Navy F/A-18s. It was obvious competition for us because we did work for F-4s and F-16s. Particularly the F-16s at least were the same generation, same basic type of work as what's done with the F-18s. So, we did that work and did participate in that competition. Much to the chagrin of the Navy, and particularly Navy North Island, we initially won that workload. As you might imagine, that was a huge coup for us, huge 7 downer for the Navy and for Navy North Island. It also ended up being sort of less alert, if you will, on how people react to those kinds of things. We did that work, we proved that we could do it cheaper. We thought that what Navy North Island did for the United States Navy—and the Marine Corps, because they also flew F-18s that were maintained at the Navy North Island—and we did it, I know we did it very, very well, but we learned the lesson. I don't know if you want to go through this as part of your history, but long story short, part of the provision for us doing that work is, they brought an F-18 to Hill Air Force Base. Because they had a shortage of jet engines, we removed the engines as part of our maintenance activity and we returned the engines to sort of the pool, if you will, of engines that the Navy and the Marine Corps managed, because they didn't have enough engines to go around for everything. What we didn't realize at the time, and we learned a major lesson, was that even when we finished the maintenance work on those Navy F-18s—and we did it very, very well, again, and did it cheaper and did it quickly—we had to wait until the Navy returned an engine to us and we put the engine back in the airplane before we could say that the airplane was complete and we could return it to the Navy. They were not very forthcoming about doing that quickly, so we quickly found out that we were considered deficient in returning F-18s to the Navy because we didn't return them in the timeframe that they wanted, even though it was not our fault that they did not get us engines back. As a result of the contract for doing that workload, because we were deficient in that, the Navy could claim that we did not meet the contract. Long story short, they ended up pulling that workload back from us and giving it back to Navy North Island. So, I consider that a foul ball on the part of the Navy. There are a lot of things that the Navy does different from us. They 8 wanted to get that workload back to their facility, and by God they did by hook and by crook. It was more crook than it was hook. SL: Yeah, no kidding. LL: We learned a lesson about that. AK: Yeah. When you say that you won that work, do you mean, was that something that you gained from the BRAC 1993, or was there another way that you could bid for interservice work? LL: Well, it was done separate from BRAC, separate certainly from BRAC 1995, but also separate from BRAC 1993. It was part of the depot competition initiative from Congress. It became part of the depot competition activity that we competed against Navy North Island for that work. SL: Were there other contracts or work that was taken on during this time at Hill that you can think of? LL: Oh, let's see. That was the biggest one. I know there is something else, Sarah. I'm going to have to go back and look at my files, but I think there were some other things that we also ended up winning in the depot competition initiative. But the big one, as you might imagine, was the airplane workload that we took from Navy North Island. SL: In 1993, this is around the time that the Hill/DDO Group, 1995 group, was coming together, you mentioned that the work at Hill Air Force Base had become too diversified. Why was that a concern, and what did the base do to fix it? LL: Too diversified? Let's see. SL: We're pulling back all these old news articles on you. LL: Is this another Alyssa's gotcha here? What did I say? AK: Well, it's just because you had a lot of different kinds of work, so you wanted to specialize is what I understood, so I just wanted more information on that. 9 LL: Well, that was probably me that said that. I don't think you would have found everybody on the base who would have sided with me, because everybody loved the work, particularly the civilians who had been there for a long period of time. So, between landing gear, munitions, missile work, ICBM work, work on F-16s, a little bit of work on F-4s, work on C-130s. We had that whole gambit. Yeah, I may have said something about diversification, but I think that may be just my own particular comment because I don't recall anybody else supporting that viewpoint. AK: Okay, was the BRAC Commission looking at maybe how much money was being spent and having a lot of diversity in your work? Was that a concern, possibly? LL: No, I don't think that was one of their concerns, in all honesty, as long as we get the workload done and we did it both with quality and on time and efficiently. I take that back. I know they looked at cost of getting workload done, if you will, particularly in trying to determine whether something should be realigned to some other organization. But we did our work at Hill very, very well so that was not a big concern on our part. SL: You said that between 1993 and 1995, they reigned in the military commanders being involved in the BRAC process. So, did you have any involvement at all with the Hill-DDO 1995 group? LL: Oh yeah. We could talk to the community and keep them aware of things and make sure that they were smart and knowledgeable, because the community could do things. But we couldn't, ourselves, lobby with the BRAC commissioners or lobby with politicians. Keeping the community informed was something that I always considered to be good leadership on any base. One of the things that I tried to do was to make sure that the community knew as much as possible, so that they could they could speak accurately and intelligently to the BRAC commissioners about what's going on at Hill Air Force Base. 10 SL: Okay, so we've heard a lot of the outside of Hill feelings about the BRAC 1995 round, what was the feeling inside of Hill as the BRAC 1995 round was going on? Was there a lot of worry from people, because Hill was basically on the closure list? LL: You know, the answer is yes. I mean, everybody's always worried about going through any BRAC process because the last thing you want is closure, but you also don't want to lose large parts of workload. The answer was yes. There was angst and strong concerns, both on the base, but obviously in the community, about what could happen. Particularly since we, the military leaders, couldn't participate, that put even more of a premium on making sure the community was aware of what was going on and was aware of understanding how well we did our job. AK: One of the things that I read that you did, which I thought was really admirable, was that you would have brown bagger lunches where people could ask you questions, like workers at Hill. Do you feel like that helped them? Kind of like to help boost morale, did that seem to be effective? LL: The answer is yes, it's the kind of thing I've done in all my commands or wherever I've been. Since that was my first big command role as a two-star, it was sort of a lesson learned for me, and I applied it to other places as I got to be a three-star and a four-star—my two three-star jobs and my two four-star jobs in the Air Force. But I think taking care of your people, one of the things to take care of people is communicating with them. I don't know if you found this in your writing somewhere, Alyssa, but most people who have worked with or for me know that my three-word motto for trying to deal with things is communicate, communicate, communicate. I try to do that as best I possibly could to keep the workforce informed, to answer their questions, because I knew they had questions, and to keep the community informed. 11 AK: Excellent. Thank you. Another thing that I had read about—sorry, I feel like a stalker—was you mentioned that the governor asked you to do technology transfers, and I didn't entirely know what that meant. I was wondering if you could help clarify that for me? LL: Well, technology transfer is something you still hear about today in the military. That was looking at ways and possibilities of transferring technology that we're using in the military to commercial applications in industry or in the community. I think it was Mike Leavitt at the time was very interested in Hill as we were the number one employer for the state of Utah. That activity was to look at, "Are there technologies that we're working on at the base, technologies we work on for national security, that could be shared with the general community to help them determine the application to either commercial use, or for commercial sale, or that sort of thing?" Even in today's military, there is a large push on commercial transfer of technology. There's sort of a reverse now because more technology is in the country. This country is more developed in the commercial applications than in the military, which is not quite the case back in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, there's a different type of technology transfer looking at how we can transfer technology going on in the commercial sector to national security use. Tech transfer has always been a very, very heavy interest, in that it's sort of switched roles, if you will, today versus what it was back then. AK: Okay, so I just want to make sure I understand it correctly. So, at that time, during 1993, 1995, the technology transfer had more to do with the military maybe doing work that the community couldn't do because of the technology? LL: Not work, it was actually sharing the technology with the community to see if there are any commercial applications that they may have, if we could share that technology. A lot of technology has security classification and can't be shared. But 12 there's some other things that could be shared with the community and commercial organizations that they might find applications to further develop it or use it for general purposes in the community, or to sell it. AK: Okay, that makes sense. SL: In 1994, Brigadier General Charles Perez left as your vice commander, and the decision was to replace him with a civilian Executive Director, Thomas Miner. So, we were just wondering what the reason was behind that decision? LL: Well, that was something going on throughout the Air Force, in particular Air Force Materiel Command. The Air Force Materiel Command had a process of having a commander, a vice commander, and then because Materiel Command has the largest contingent of civilians in the entire Air Force. At the time I was the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command, there were roughly 80,000 people in the command, but 50,000 thousand of them, roughly, were civilians. We had civilian Executive Directors at each Materiel Command base, to make sure that there were somebody who was looking at it and worried about the interests of the civilian workforce. So, in part because of that, and in part because there was an interest in reducing the number of flag officers—Congress is always interested in reducing the number of general officers—it just made sense to consider doing away with vice commanders at some bases and having a sort of vice commander and executive director who was a civilian. So, that was taking place throughout the Air Force Materiel Command. SL: Okay. Do you know, was Thomas able to, did he have to follow the same rules as you did, in regards to BRAC, or was he able to help? LL: Well, yes, he was a military leader of the organization. He may have been a civilian, but he was a leader in the Air Force and so he had to also follow the same rules. SL: Same rules, so he couldn’t have a lot of interaction. 13 LL: No. SL: Interesting. AK: Okay, so in January 1994, you announced a reduction in force. How did that affect readiness for BRAC? Were there any negative impacts on that? I know it wasn't related to BRAC at all, but I was just wondering how that looked to the BRAC commissioners and what not? LL: Well, you know, in all honesty, I never recall the BRAC commissioners looking at that negatively at all. They saw it as essentially building in greater efficiency at the base. If you have, I'll use the word 'excess' of the workforce, and you needed to reduce said workforce to make it comparable to the amount of work you have in a reduction in force, that was sort of looked at possibly as an efficiency move on the part of the base. So, I don't recall that being considered negative by the BRAC Committee. Nobody wants a rift reduction in force on their base and so the community wasn't very happy about that, and obviously, the part of the workforce that was affected with that was not very happy. AK: Did you need to do anything to kind of help with community relations after that then? LL: Yeah, but it was part of what I tried to do anyway and that is communicate, communicate, communicate, and to keep talking to them to make sure they understood why. This is not unusual for any base; I still deal with this at other bases that I do consulting work for today. But you mention the loss of one person and everybody in the community gets very nervous that means that we're going to be on the list for closure at the next opportunity, so the community was extremely worried. If it had only been five people we reduce as opposed to maybe a couple of hundred, it would have been the same reaction. It's a natural one, you want to protect the workload and the economy in your community. So, talking to the community to 14 make sure they understood why and soothing their angst, so that they didn't automatically assume, "Woe is me, we're going to be closed at the next opportunity." So, communicate, communicate, communicate was even more important. SL: I think one of the things we've learned from talking to people is Hill's probably biggest strength was the work force efficiency. Were there ways that you tried to improve that base efficiency during your time here? LL: Well, right around that time I think everybody in the Air Force, and I think all of the Department of Defense, but particularly in the Air Force, had very much embraced TQM, Total Quality Management, and the teachings of Edward Jimmy, and the Japanese, on how you looked at your workload, and how you address your workload, and how work was done, and understanding the flow of work so you can be more efficient. As the example at Hill, I'll use the term, I was blown away at some of the work activity, some of the activity at parts of the base at the workers. Some people think TQM and all that sort of stuff requires a college degree or something like that. I was really blown away the way everybody that I saw embraced how you could apply those Total Quality Management principles. I'll never forget going up to the flight line, the guys who were doing the maintenance on C-130s and F-16s, and how they essentially laid out every step of every work that they did. How it flowed from one particular part of the base to another, or one particular part of the hangar to another, and literally defining exactly how work actually took place. It sort of blows your mind when you see it accomplished. These workers show using sticky tape or the sticky notes to lay out every particular step and how things flow, and then use that to figure out, "Hey, why do we do this? It would be more efficient if we did this or that, or we moved what we did here to another part of 15 the hangar." So, it flowed quicker and easier. Just seeing how they embraced that and how it just automatically led to greater efficiency in the workload that was done. Then seeing these, I'll use this term affectionately, grizzled old men and women who've been on the flight line doing this thing for a long time, who really had never either had the opportunity to lay out every step of the work and figure out, "Hey, we could do it quicker and easier if we did this or we did that." So, we just became more efficient using the principles of Total Quality Management. SL: Interesting. So, were you aware that Hill was on the closure list before the official announcement came out that reversed that? LL: Well, the answer is we thought that might be a possibility. But again, Sarah and Alyssa, I think every base is not guaranteed protection during BRAC. We were prepared if that were to be the case, if there was a decision from the BRAC commissioners to close, either realign a part of our workload or to recommend closure, we're prepared to make sure that where we had an opportunity, we could defend what we had or go back and make sure the community and even the politicians had an opportunity to address that decision and to figure out, "Is that the right kind of decision and are there ways we could reverse it?" So, the answer is I won't say we were aware from the beginning, but as they got closer to their decisions, we knew pretty well that something like that might happen and we were prepared as how to react to it. SL: What was your involvement when the BRAC Commission actually came to Utah? Did you meet with them? I mean, I don't really know the whole process of that. LL: Yeah, we did. It turns out I knew a bunch of them anyway from other activities in my career and in some of their careers, even those of other services. There was an opportunity to meet them, particularly when they first came to the base, to brief them, to talk to them about both the workload that's there, how efficient it is, and 16 what I thought about the opportunities. So, yeah, we did have an opportunity to do that. Sort of serendipity, I got to know one of the major commissioners who was very much involved in looking at the depots. His name was Major General Joe Robles. He was a major general in the Army. Joe eventually became the CEO of USAA. As you probably know, I ended up serving on the board of USAA and ended up, the last seven years or so, being the chairman of the board of USAA. Joe and I talked about that time when he was on the BRAC Commission. We talked about that a lot. We talked about how he was totally impressed with the things that we did, how he didn't agree with the decision to put us on the closure list, and he knew there was going to probably be an opportunity to reverse that. I learned a lot about the process after-hand, if you will, by having the opportunity to work closely with one of the former commissioners of that particular BRAC Commission. SL: What was your feeling—Because we know when the commission came in, Hill/DDO 1995 had the streets lined with people, and we've seen photos of people outside of Hill. What was your feeling of the community support for Hill Air Force Base? LL: Oh, I think the community support has always been great for Hill Air Force Base. There's so many dimensions and so many things that the community does for the base and the base men and women, for their families, and things that we did to make sure that we were looked at as sort of a family, if you will. I was always very, very impressed and pleased with the support from the community. SL: Were military personnel allowed to be in those parades, or was it mostly just the civilians? LL: Oh, I don't remember, but I don't think they were excluded. There's nothing to say that military members, particularly the families, couldn't be part of something like 17 that. That was not part of the restrictions. The restrictions were on part of the leadership at the base from being lobbying for their particular activity. SL: Okay, so the low-level military personnel could have possibly been involved. LL: With one caveat. In my opinion, there's no such thing as a low-level part of the military. SL: Right. Sorry. LL: Everybody's very important. No such thing as a low-level. AK: Well, in my stalker work, I was noticing that it looked like the military personnel were allowed to be involved after hours. Is that correct? LL: Yes. AK: Okay. I just want to make sure because sometimes the newspapers get it wrong. Thank you. SL: So, you left Hill in November of 1994 and handed the reins over to Pat Condon, who saw Hill through the BRAC. What was it like for you to let go so far into the process? LL: Well, I was concerned a little bit, but that concern and my concern were allayed because I knew we had a first-rate team, we had great leadership at the base, we had the continuity provided with people like Tom Miner, the executive director, and all the civilian leadership on the base, we had the community support. It was easy for me to flip the switch, if you will, because then I had to worry about BRAC relative to the space community of the Space and Missile Center in Los Angeles that I took over. So, I made that switch and had to make that switch very, very quickly, and I felt very confident that Hill was in great hands. SL: Did you give any advice to Pat Condon when he took over, that you remember? LL: I gave advice, I don't know whether he liked it or accepted it. The main advice I gave him was—Pat's a good friend, by the way, and he and I still engage on a 18 couple of things where I still work with him. I just told him to make sure he just takes care of the people and listen to the people. Probably the biggest advice I gave him was making sure, something that Pat does very naturally anyway, he keeps the community informed and engages with the community. I didn't have to worry about what he would do relative to the workload. I didn't worry about what he would do relative to the base, per se. We had Tom Miner as the executive director. I think the number one advice I gave him was to make sure he keep in touch with the community and that he took care of the people in the community, just like he did the people at the base. AK: So, as was probably mentioned, we're trying to write a little book about the BRAC 1995. I was just wondering, is there anything else that we didn't cover that you feel would be important for us to know? LL: Well, help me, Alyssa, for you and Sarah, to whom have you talked in the community of about the process and about BRAC 1995? SL: Interview-wise that we've done so far, Vickie McCall. LL: Okay, she was going to be the first person I mentioned. SL: Yeah, Vickie McCall, Mike Pavich. We're actually interviewing Pat Condon after the New Year. SL: We're trying to get Governor Leavitt and a lot of the people that were involved in that Hill-DDO 1995. It's interesting you mentioned Joe Robles because he is on our list of people to talk to, especially with his involvement at the Defense Depot Ogden. Although we're not focusing on that, I think that's a different story we'll try to capture. LL: That's good. Well, Joe would be a good one to talk to. He's had some health issues. He retired as the CEO of USAA about three years ago. He's had some health issues, but he's still sharp mentally for sure. So, he'd be a great one to talk to. 19 SL: I'm trying to think of anyone else on our list. LL: Forgive me, because I don't know, is former Congressman Jim Hansen still alive? SL: He is not, unfortunately. LL: God bless his soul. Okay. SL: Yeah, I mean, because he is the one that really was instrumental. We're trying to get his two chiefs of staff. They both worked for Representative Rob Bishop, who we interviewed, so we're trying to get them now that Bishop is going to be out of office in January. Luckily, Hansen donated all his papers to Utah State University, so we went up there and researched through there. LL: Oh, great. SL: But to be able to get some more personal stories I think would be of interest. LL: Yeah, he was a wonderful leader and gentleman. So, to answer your question, Alyssa, I can't think of anybody. You mentioned Mike Pavich already. LL: Mike has a unique perspective because he's been associated with a couple of ALCs. So, the fact that Utah is sort of home for him, he brings a different perspective to things. I can't think of anybody else off the top of my head. AK: No, that's just fine. Thank you. SL: Well, I think that's all the questions. LL: In your stalker mode, you probably will find somebody else. AK: I hope so. Yeah. SL: We have a pretty decent list of people, community and former military, that we're talking to. LL: Okay, let's see. Gracious, this is another one I hope I'm not saying the wrong thing. I'm trying to think. Boyd, my former reserve assistant and reserve one-star. Boyd. Why can't I think of Boyd's last name? Because he was big in the community. SL: So, not Stu Boyd? 20 LL: No, no, that's Stu. This is his first name, Boyd, and he was my military reserve augmentee. I don't know if he's still alive either. If I think of his last name, I'll get back to you. SL: Yeah, get back to us. If not, I'll send Alyssa into stalker mode, and I'm sure she might be able to track him down. LL: Yeah, well, if you just look at my organization chart, you'll see the reserve assistant, mobilization assistant. Boyd, gracious, he was very close friends with my wife, too, so I should know his last name but all I refer to him is Boyd. Pat Condon will know him too. SL: Yeah, okay, we'll ask Pat. Well, thank you so much, General Lyles. It was a pleasure that we got to do this with you. I'm glad we found you and tracked you down. Your name kept popping up, so we did some super sleuthing to find an address for you. LL: Oh, wow. I’m usually pretty easy to find. SL: Well, I couldn't find an address to send you anything. LL: Yeah. Then I changed my email address and so that probably made it a little bit difficult. SL: We really appreciate you taking some time out this morning to talk to us about this. LL: Well, how long is this effort going on? SL: So, we're going to be doing interviews until the summer, and then we're going to regroup in the summer with the members of the Utah Defense Alliance to talk about the book that they want to produce based on it. LL: Okay, well, please feel free to come back to me if you find more stalking things that you want to ask about. Actually, I'm kidding when I say that. This actually has been fun just to recall some of the things that took place back then. I'd love to answer any further questions, or if you have anything else you want to pursue, we could either 21 do it by Zoom or email. Just let me know. I feel honored to have the opportunity to support you guys. SL: Well, thank you so much. We appreciate it. AK: Yeah. We really appreciate it, because we knew you were really involved in helping Hill Air Force Base during this time, so thank you. I really, really appreciate you letting us ask all these questions. LL: Okay, great. Again, related to that, in my capacity as a vice chief of staff of the Air Force and then as the commander of Air Force Materiel Command, I've continued to have involvement with Hill Air Force Base, so if you want a perspective from either one of those, even though it would be after BRAC 1995, I'd be happy to answer any questions I can. SL: Okay, we'll keep that in mind as we move forward and do that. Thank you so much. LL: Thank you. Well, you guys please have a very blessed and safe Merry Christmas and happy holidays. SL: You too. 22