Oral History Program Junior Edward Rich Interviewed by Mack S. Taft circa 1960s Oral History Program Weber State University Stewart Library Ogden, Utah Junior Edward Rich Interviewed by Mack S. Taft circa 1960s Copyright © 2016 by Weber State University, Stewart Library iii Mission Statement The Oral History Program of the Stewart Library was created to preserve the institutional history of Weber State University and the Davis, Ogden and Weber County communities. By conducting carefully researched, recorded, and transcribed interviews, the Oral History Program creates archival oral histories intended for the widest possible use. Interviews are conducted with the goal of eliciting from each participant a full and accurate account of events. The interviews are transcribed, edited for accuracy and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewees (as available), who are encouraged to augment or correct their spoken words. The reviewed and corrected transcripts are indexed, printed, and bound with photographs and illustrative materials as available. The working files, original recording, and archival copies are housed in the University Archives. Project Description The Great Depression in Weber County, Utah, is an Oral History Project by Mack S. Taft for completion of his Master’s Thesis at Utah State University during the summer of 1969. The forty-five interviews address the Great Depression through the eyes of individuals in several different occupations including: Bankers, Laborers, Railroad Workers, Attorneys, Farmers, Educators, Businessmen, Community and Church Leaders, Housewives, Children and Physicians. All of these individuals lived in Weber County from 1929 to 1941. The interviews were based on what they remembered about the depression, how they felt about those events and how it affected their life then and now. ____________________________________ Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account. It reflects personal opinion offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable. ____________________________________ Rights Management This work is the property of the Weber State University, Stewart Library Oral History Program. It may be used freely by individuals for research, teaching and personal use as long as this statement of availability is included in the text. It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows: Rich, Junior Edward, an oral history by Mack S. Taft, circa 1960s, WSU Stewart Library Oral History Program, University Archives, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden, UT. 1 Abstract: This is an oral history interview with Junior Edward Rich. Dr. Rich discusses the difficulties of practicing medicine during the Depression: collecting fees, changes in obstetric procedure, and taking script as payment. He also discusses the closing of the Ogden State Bank. The interviewer is Mack Taft. MT: What was your profession during the Depression years? JR: I was an M.D., a doctor. MT: What do you remember about your profession at that time, the difficult times that you had, if there were some? JR: Well, it was a trying time for the doctors. They all had certain costs of operation, and the income of the doctors dropped off so radically. I know in my own experience that I was probably collecting maybe 90 percent of the fees outstanding, while during the Depression years, it dropped off to where I was probably only collecting 10 percent. In fact, some months I had difficulty paying my nurse, and paying my overhead, rent, incidentals, and medical supplies, and so on. People were just unable to pay for the service that was rendered. Of course we were working harder than ever because it seemed like there was more work at that time, and a person couldn't do anything other than render the service and put the charge on the books, and hope that sometime the person might be able to pay. But the question was getting enough income to take care of fixed commitments and expenditures that one had to meet, and some months, it was actually operating in the red. You were digging into what little reserve you had to meet the expenses to keep going. 2 In fact, at that time, there was an organization, I've forgotten the name now, that amongst the professional men and some of the merchants, that set up a script type of money. The farmers would bring in the produce - they had a large department area down, I think it was in the Berthana building on the ground floor - four bare walls and so on, and just merchandise piled around the walls of the building, and so on. And one would take the script in there and receive vegetables or fruits and produce of different types. That would kind of give you an idea of the way the economy was going. People would bring vegetables and fruits into that place, and then they would get script and come up and pay the doctor with the script - or the dentist, or the other individuals - and he, in turn, would go down to that building and pick up a few vegetables, and so on. That seems a rather primitive way of doing business, but still during the Depression, that was what was going on - that was in the years about 1930, 1931, and 1932 through there. And then there were certain outfits that set up on gas stations that were pretty much the same way. They would give you, for a little fee to set up membership, they would sell you gas for cost. Even some of the professional men were having their nurses deliver statements within a near radius rather than put out money to pay the postage, and so on because even the postage amount that was expended became prohibitive considering the income that was coming in. Many of the things that we resorted to were with just the idea of keeping going because at that time rents were a kind of a fixed expenditure, and other things, they didn't vary much, and it was a problem. A lot of charitable work was 3 being done, a lot of home work being done, and more operating work in the offices that could be done because the people just didn't have the means of paying the hospital. I imagine the hospitals also were creating a good deal of credit, and putting amounts on the books that previously were paid for by cash. So everything was in a precarious position. Of course a lot of the professional men at the time, due to the boom years of 1928-29 with the stock market going up and so on, many professional men had opened trading accounts, and not only professional men, but others were operating on a margin account, which at that time, were about 10 percent. A person had to put up about 10 percent money for the total cost of the purchase, and carry the account of margin. Then when the stock market, of course, began to drop, why every few points the broker would call for more money to maintain the 10 percent spread. And as a result it finally got to the point where the person couldn't put up the money, and they had to let the stock go, and they'd lose everything that they had in it. Of course a corrective thing came along later whereby they had to put up a 50 percent or even 100 percent margin, and then, of course, naturally they were protected against their own vice, so to speak. But when you think of, for instance, as a personal experience, I watched a stock like, say, Anaconda Copper. Professional men, many of them would buy into the exchange market rather than buy land and so on because it's an easy way of doing it. It doesn't require a good deal of outside management and distraction from their practice and so on. And I had been interested in Anaconda Copper, just as an instance, and I'd watched it go from $176 to the neighborhood 4 of $56. And so, after it got down there, I started buying some Anaconda Copper stock, thinking that it couldn't get... it's a giveaway, and so on. And I went ahead and bought it, and it kept dropping and dropping and finally it got down to a point where I thought that I ought to even up my purchase, it was so much lower. It got down around in the $20s and finally I wound up buying my last purchase at $4 a share. And it went down to $3 a share after that. Now that just gives you an idea of the values. Now, for instance, Electric Bond and Share went down from $556 to 75 cents a share, and when you think of value, you can see how people were broke. People who owed money for stocks were just hopelessly wiped out. But the person that owned the stocks outright, of course, and could hold them throughout that whole thing, were not particularly hurt because it turned out to be a paper loss. But the one great lesson of the Depression years in borrowing was the fact that if you owned it outright, you couldn't be hurt, but if you owned it on margin, and owed the banks for it, then, of course, that is where you could be wiped out and be hurt because you had a two-way spread. For instance, if a person had a loan at the bank and had gone ahead and borrowed money to buy some commodity or some stock or property or so on, and he put up, say, what he thought at the time was just absolutely gold, maybe triple A bonds, and then one would never figure that the bonds would never, maybe at the worst, go below 90, why some of these bonds that were put up as collateral went down maybe as low as $25 on the hundred. It was the matter of the two-way spread. Not only was the value of the thing you bought going down, 5 but the value of the collateral that you put up was going down, so that you had a two-way spread, and it was more difficult all the time to raise money. And, of course the banks were, at that time during the heyday of '29, were encouraging people to take loans. Why, when things got tough, then they began to tighten down, and sure, when the loan was made, oh, no, this was fine, they required you to put up a little collateral. During the Depression years, as it got tougher, the banks got tougher, and of course they called for more and more collateral, until finally a fellow only had the gold left in his teeth to put up. And all he could do was say, "Well, there it is," and the banks, of course, went ahead and threw the collateral on the market, and it just forced prices down, down, down. And that was the panic of all this, that caused it. But it was very difficult on the profession. I know two or three doctors that had stock in ranches and things like that, and they finally wound up having to let all their stock go because assessments were made on the stock and the assessments couldn't be paid, so they just had to kiss the whole thing goodbye. One doctor here in Ogden had a very large investment in some Nevada ranches and so on, and, in 1928, he could have sold those out for about $300,000, as I remember it. He wound up letting it all go because he couldn't pay a $2 assessment on the stock. He lost the whole thing. So that many doctors were hurt, and some doctors in the profession were having such a tough time of it that the society had to kind of come to their aid with the doctors that were getting along fairly good putting up a little fund each month to kind of carry them over and keep them in business and let them keep their self-respect ...I mentioned 6 about the script, and that helped some, but you took short-cuts that you'd never dream of before to conserve your capital and your outlay. MT: Do you remember any specific little innovations that you used to speed up your collection or to increase your business, other than script? JR: At that time it was so difficult to know the exact economic status of the individual that you were treating in the profession, that rather than to send out letters and things of that nature requesting help in meeting our financial obligations, we hired an individual, who was tickled to death to get the work because there were so many out of work, to personally visit the people who were not making any payment whatsoever to ascertain their circumstances and whether or not they could make some small payment in the way of money, or even in the way of goods, or something that could be used. That worked out very satisfactorily for us. I don't know, I say us, because at that time I was associated with my father, Dr. Edward I. Rich, in a partnership, and that helped because we got an exact, intimate knowledge of the family's condition. If they couldn't [pay], well, they couldn't, and you went along rendering the same aid, like I say, with the hope that eventually they might get to the point where they might be able to make some payment on the account. MT: When did you start your practice? JR: In January of 1926. And I practiced up until 1965, January 1965. At the end of 40 years, the last 30 years of my practice were devoted to general surgical work, and so on. I left in June of 1942, and spent three and one-half years in the service during the war. Other than those years, and being away occasionally for 7 short times, or for graduate work and conventions, I practiced in Ogden for the full time. MT: Who were some of the new doctors that came in right during the Depression years - do you recall? JR: Well, there was Dr. Wilbur Wilson, and Dr. C. J. Olsen, and let's see, those were two, and Dr. Wes Anderson started up about 1931 or '32. He was interning up at the hospital at that time. And also Dr. Olsen and Dr. Wilson were both interns about 1929, 1930 or thereabouts - that would be in Ogden. Dr. Reed Rich over at Montpelier, Idaho, was interning about that time. MT: Now, are there any other doctors at that time that are still around that were established prior to the crash of the stock market? JR: These are the only ones that I can think of. When I first came here and started practicing in 1926, I think that all of the doctors have either died or retired that were practicing then. But there are two or three of them that are alive that are retired. One is Dr. Vern Ward, and he is an obstetrician, you know, but he lives up here. And there is Dr. George Phizter, and he lives up on 29th Street. He was in neurology at that time. Dr. Olsen wasn't a doctor then, but he was in Salt Lake as a laboratory man and he graduated later. Even though I'm younger, I had been in practice at least two or three years when he was an intern. Dr. Frank Bartlett is out at the chronic disease hospital in Roy, but he may be able to give you quite a little help. He may be alert enough. MT: Now, let's go back into this area we explored before on the bank closing. 8 JR: Of course the closing of the Ogden State Bank had a distinctive shocking effect upon our local community here. It was really the first thing, I think, that brought home the seriousness of the Depression. At the time there was a good deal of information in the papers about the situation through the East and the many banks that were closing. And the thing began to snowball, and people became so apprehensive that this run started on the Ogden State Bank. People just all of a sudden decided that they ought to get their money and put it in a sack instead of leaving it in the bank. And when the run started on the Ogden State Bank, it was probably one of the older and more stable banks. It had done a lot of service for the community. It had probably been a little more liberal than many of the other banks in granting loans to ranchers and stockmen and that long-range loan plan where the loan can be readily liquidated. As a result of having a disproportionate amount of their loanable funds out in this type of loan, why with this demand for cash, they found it difficult to convert these loans into cash adequate to meet the demands of the depositors. It seemed like kind of a groundswell of fear that came up, and as the run started, why they couldn't get any funds. They appealed to the First Security Bank, which was a federal bank and having difficulty of its own. In fact, just after the closing of the Ogden State Bank, it had a run. The fact that the First Security Bank was able to tell them, "Line up for your money, and we'll pay all of you," it kind of quelled it down. There was a big meeting in the lobby of the bank, at which the president of the bank reassured them and said that the money was there, and all they had to 9 do was line up and get it. That kind of put the quietness on the run, and established some form of sense in the public. But the Ogden State Bank went ahead and tried to meet their demands, and ran out of cash and couldn't raise any more. And, as a result, they closed up and went into a forced liquidation of their assets. In spite of that, they paid off practically 100 percent. I know that I was a depositor in the bank, and, as I recall, I received all my money, which was in a checking account, at the end of about a year and a half of liquidation. But they sold out assets at probably 10 or 15 percent of their real value under a forced liquidation program, and it was too bad because the bank need never have closed. They had assets of two to three to one, but they just couldn't convert them. But the thing was, it was not just the banks that were having the problem in assets and in getting liquid. The same thing pertained to individuals. I know that at the time prior to the 1929 crash, when everything was favorable, and everyone was skyrocketing prices and outbidding each other for anything, especially in the way of securities, that a person didn't hesitate at all to go into debt to buy securities because they were sold on the idea that they were 100 percent gilt-edged. So, many people were encouraged, and now I feel that the bankers were somewhat at fault for this because they encouraged people. They had plenty of money, and they encouraged people to come in and take loans on collateral that probably wasn't nearly adequate after things got worse. And people would go ahead and buy a stock, and then, of course, after the crash came, they only owned 10 percent of it because that's all the money that they 10 had to put up under the margin requirements. Every time the stocks would drop 10 points, the stock market would call them and they wanted more collateral, they wanted more money. And the person would keep putting up the money until finally they had exhausted all their means of raising any money. And loan companies, people that had money in the building and loan companies, were drawing it out until the building and loan companies were broke. The thing was that a person would go ahead to a bank and want to borrow some money, and they would put up a normal amount of collateral, and the collateral probably was even some gilt-edged bonds that people wouldn't ever expect to go down. But the bonds that ordinarily shouldn't ever go below 90 went down to 26 percent, and the stocks that were selling up in the 100s went down to practically zero. But when you see a stock like General Motors go down to about 7 percent a share, which - considering the splits and everything of stocks - you can imagine how cheap these stocks got. But it was a trying time. Now, some doctors in our community lost a lot of money. The friend that lost the money on the ranches in Nevada finally had his stock assessed. And, as I remember, it was only about a $2 assessment per share. As I remember, he couldn't even raise the money to pay the $2 assessment per share and had to let all his stock go, so that he not only lost his stock, but he also still owed the banks for some of the money that he had borrowed to buy the stock. So he was really paying for a dead horse afterward. That was the sad part about some of these things. You not only lost, but you still owed. But that was the problem at that time. 11 And I think one of the greatest lessons to be learned from the individuals that experienced this thing, who happened to be at that age in life where he was buying things and in an attempt to look out for the future, and his retirement and this sort of thing, is that they didn't owe. The one thing that I learned was never to buy anything on borrowed money. In fact I've always said since that the only justification for anyone to borrow money was if they were properly putting it in their own business to tide them through a time when they had full control of it. But to borrow money to put in somebody else's business is just sure death. MT: Do you feel that you would have developed that much conservatism if you hadn't lived through the Depression? Or do you feel that's a contributing factor of the Depression in your life? JR: Well, I think that lesson comes because of having experienced the Depression, and that it probably had a very good effect even nationally, that people became more conservative. From the standpoint of venturing into the unknown, and to go through this experience, I think that it has paid off, personally, many times over, because it has changed my whole thinking about investments, about what is worthwhile, what isn't worthwhile, and the true values in life and in our economic life. In fact, I had an experience prior to this Depression during my school years, during my junior and senior years in medical school in Pennsylvania. I went to Europe for four months and it was at the time that the German nation was going through the wringer. I remember going into Germany when the mark was 18,000 to the dollar. I spent six weeks in Germany during this time overseas, and when I came out, it was 65 million to the dollar. Of course it didn't cost me anything to 12 live there because I had outside dollars. I changed one dollar a day and then wished that I could only change 50 cents because it was only costing me 10 or 15 cents to live a day. But for the person that had to make their money there, they contracted a salary and at the end of two weeks, the salary wouldn't have been enough to buy a good meal. So that was a very early experience in this business of what inflation and depression and other things can do to an economy. This was in 1923 when Hitler made his first push. In fact, in Munich one night they had these big meetings and so on. He failed in that, and that was when the money and the economy were going to pot. And of course our Depression was just the aftermath of all these things overseas and so on. In fact I've always said that Hoover was just such an unfortunate man to have gone into the Depression when he did, when this was the backwash of the whole worldwide affair, for which he got blamed. He was probably our most able, intelligent and best educated man that we've ever had in the presidency. In fact, I knew Herbert Hoover. I'd taken care of his son, along with another San Francisco doctor when I was at Stanford in San Francisco. I had occasion to meet him and know him and develop a good deal of respect and admiration for him that made me feel kind of doubly bad that he got behind the eight-ball on this kind of thing as a result of just a set of circumstances that would have probably killed anyone. MT: Before we started the recording, you said that you felt that perhaps President Roosevelt was responsible for part of this. Would you explore that just a bit? 13 JR: Well, I've always felt that the bank closing was really unnecessary, that the election in November and the time of the election, and this time that Roosevelt was elected into office was the critical time of the whole Depression. That was when the banks were closing and that is when everything was going to pot fast. Hoover asked, after he was defeated in the election, he called upon Roosevelt to come in and jointly work with him on this. And Roosevelt sat back there and wouldn't help in any way, and wouldn't consent to anything even though Hoover said, and I recall reading it in the paper publicly, that any credit would go to Roosevelt. All he wanted was to stop this sort of thing. But Roosevelt wouldn't even give a recommendation or even meet with President Hoover. He wouldn't even accept an invitation to meet with him until after he went into office. And when he was officially in office, then of course he took his first steps to start correction of this thing, which should have been done several months before. I mean that's the way I remember the thing, and the way things were going, because I remember the bank business in a state of panic and fear that was building up and up and up. And it could have been stopped if the two of them had gotten together and taken some of these steps. MT: What else do you remember about the time, the economy, and what people did to exist? JR: Well, everybody of course economized, and during the early days of the Depression, it made such an impact on people's minds that even after things got going along fairly well, there was this extreme reversal instead of a tendency to spending, as prior to the Depression - which partly accounted for the big boom 14 and everything. People reacted and there was a tendency not to normally spend, but also since many people had that debt still hanging over their heads from things they lost, rather than go into bankruptcy that many of them were working to pay off. As a result, a lot of the money that people were finally making when they had jobs and were doing very well, was going toward repaying things that had been carried on credit during those lean years. As a result the economy was rather slow coming back, even though the government was pumping money into all of these public works and so on. But it always reminded me of how a group can be panicked, or like a stampede of cattle. But after the big flare is over and solved, then you begin to repair the damage that never would need to have been in the first place. As a result it was we had a few good years, and along about 1934 and '35, things began to go pretty good. And then we had a Depression, which in many ways was probably even more severe than the Depression of the early 30s. That was in 1937 that things got bad, but because of the fact that the people had been conditioned to this sort of thing, they didn't panic, they didn't stampede, and as a result some phase of the economy didn't realize that we were in that severe depression in 1937. But actually we never recovered from the Depression until World War II came along, and then the spending on armaments and the preparation for war and furnishing other countries and so on [turned] the wheels of industry to such an extent that we finally pulled out of it. And of course that was in spite of all the pump-priming and all the money that was laid out through the years of the early Roosevelt administration. We still had not recovered from 15 the Depression. We were being carried artificially, and so on, and it was only when World War II came along. It's a sad commentary that the expenditures of the war were necessary to take us out of the deflation. Yet, still, that has held true in other cases as well, since World War II. But I think that it was a long, drawn-out affair in recovery because of a re-adjustment of people. People had lost their homes and their ranches and so on because of being in debt. They went and moved to other parts of the country, took up probably other businesses, and went into other vocations or professions and what not. As a result, it was a great period in the country of readjustment. Maybe as a result of all of it, it was for the better, like going through the fire and coming out a bit purified, at least in our thinking. But it was an experience. After the first mad rush of panic, then the expression became not so much one of fear and panic as it was one of slow, tough rebuilding process. MT: Which section of people were more severely affected by the Depression - those who lived in the country, those who lived in the city? JR: Well, that would be difficult to say. I feel that the group that was probably least affected were those that were probably rural and kind of living on the land, that their pattern of living was not affected as much as the person who was depending upon a salary check. The ability to buy things became unavailable, even though they might have been fortunate enough to continue on in a job. Of course from the standpoint of the professional man, and maybe the people who were living on the farm or the ranch, while they maintained more of their own standard of living and were less affected unless their ranch or farm was taken 16 away from them as a result of being in debt - and many people were in debt for numerous things that they didn't really need. They had gone into debt because they were booming time, and then the debt time came along. But generally speaking, I'd say the person living in the city was strapped more because the basic elements of living were more difficult for them to get than the person who was on the ranch or the farm. In fact some of them on the ranches and the farms got along very well, and were very little affected by the Depression if they had escaped this debt, this death trap. A lot of people economized. There was very little traveling, very little, if any, unnecessary expenditure. In fact, people that previously liked to take a trip to the coast and so on, if they took a trip at all - I know people in this town that ordinarily would take a bedroom suite, this that and the other - would ride a chair car. Just to give you an example of people that still had means, but this idea that they didn't, that this forced retrenchment of expenditures would cause them to go ahead and ride a chair car down there because it was less expensive. This feeling of retrenchment was so profound and as a result all that did was aggravate the overall spiral. It was this sort of fear and panic that got us into the trouble. It wasn't that we didn't have everything that we had before; it was just that there was no circulation of profit. Everything was entrenched. There wasn't money available. Nobody was making it available. It went down in the sack, what they had. MT: What would have been some of the problems of a new doctor just coming into practice at the time? 17 JR: Well, his problem of course was not - you didn't have very many doctors in the community. The society, which now has probably a couple of hundred, we only had about 24 or 30 members. But a doctor coming in had a difficult time because he couldn't collect enough cash to really pay his expenses. He'd be fairly busy, but he was putting everything on his books, and probably 95 percent or better credit. How much of that he could collect at a later date was purely problematic, so that made it a very trying time. I know that doctors at that period - might not be just at that period - but it was more of a general pattern that you always took calls. I remember through those years, and it always carried over even until I retired, I always answered a home call, especially as a younger man. If an older doctor called me about a night call that he was unable to take, and so on, I was always tickled to death to take it for someone. And of course these younger men did a lot of night calls that way, which made it possible for them to exist. They were glad to get them, and at that time too. The pattern has changed for young men coming now. In the hospitals at that time, for interns and that type of thing, they weren't paying anything except just room and board. That was all that a young doctor ever expected in the way of remuneration during his hospital years, where now the hospitals pay very fancy salaries for interns and residents, which makes it possible. Of course, another thing was that the younger doctors at that time were either single or had just married. The practice now is that doctors marry at the beginning of their medical education because it's rather prolonged. Of course it was prolonged 18 then, but this pattern has changed. As a result, a doctor starting out now starts up with a family, with probably several children, where at that time, he was a single doctor or a newly-married doctor. It was possible for them to get along a little bit easier because the demand financially was not as great. MT: What would a young doctor receive for a house call at that time? JR: Well, $4 was the going charge, $2 for an office visit, and $4 for a home visit. Of course that included any medicines and so on that you left with the patient, and any it was necessary to administer at the time. Night calls usually went up to $5 and $6 and so on. At that time, a woman could go to the hospital. In fact while I was a county physician back in the late 1920s and early 1930s, I made arrangements with the hospital, and this is when we first started taking maternity cases into the hospital. I made an arrangement with the hospital for a woman to go in and, for $30, that covered her entire hospital arrangement. Not only the delivery room changes and the drugs that were necessary, but the anesthetic, her bed and room for the 10 day period, which was the amount of time we used to keep a maternity case, and also took care of the baby and the operation of the circumcision, if that was indicated. The cost of that was sort of an overall, catch-all price that covered that. And of course at that time, the doctor charge was $30 for the care of the maternity case, and that included the prenatal visits throughout the nine months of pregnancy, the delivery, the care at the hospital, the care of the baby including circumcision, and so on, and six weeks care afterwards for both the mother and the baby. 19 The services, I guess two or three days in the hospital for the mother, which is about as long as a maternity case is kept in now, would probably run right in the neighborhood of $200-$300, besides the fact that any drugs are charged for separately and the operation upon the baby, such as circumcision, is a separate charge. The anesthesiologist has a separate charge, and the doctor in many communities - I know especially out along the coast - that the delivery charge is entirely separate from the prenatal charge and the postnatal charge. And the doctor who is in obstetrics and delivers the baby has nothing to do with the baby. When he delivers the baby, it's turned over to a pediatrician who looks after it, and his charges are separate. So the total charge of having a baby is very, very considerable over the way it used to be. Now I charged years ago, of course during the Depression years and before the Depression - the Depression didn't alter our charges, the only thing that the Depression altered was the fact that we didn't collect what we charged - but most deliveries at that time were done in the home, and the charge was no different whether they went to the hospital or had them in the home. You furnished all the materials that they paid for at the hospital, but that was just part of the overall charge. MT: How many did you deliver at home, do you recall? JR: Well, as I say, I did some maternity work as part of my general practice up until about 1939. Then I started doing just general surgery, and as a result of being in the service during World War II doing nothing but surgery, I was chief of surgical services when I came back. But I used to do a lot of maternity work during the '20s and '30s, and my father, who I was associated with, he did a lot of 20 obstetrical work during his time. In fact he delivered over 5,000 babies during his career. In fact, he practiced about 54 years, and then he just died about two years ago. He was just a few weeks short of 101. But he was one of the early pioneer physicians in this area, so it was quite interesting to be associated with him because I carried on doing a lot of work. For instance I used to do a lot of tonsil work in the office which a lot of doctors didn't do, just because Father got me in the habit of doing it and I continued on even after it was kind of the acceptable procedure to do them in the hospital. Of course a lot of these things are done there because the public has demanded it, not because it's better, but because they go for certain things in the medical profession. And that is one reason for the higher prices is that a doctor doesn't dare do some of things even though it's better and safer for them because if anything happened to them, why the public is suit conscious. As a result, the public has made it so that they aren't getting the same care because a doctor won't venture for them, even where they haven't any chance the other way. The doctor isn't going to do it.