15- exploration for uranium is virtually stagnant and will remain so until some new incentive is provided. Therefore the likelihood of new discoveries is remote. Second, a substantial part of the existing U. S. reserves will be consumed in filling contracts between now and 1966, and many of the present companies will perhaps be out of the picture by that time. Third, while technology and design of nuclear power plants is making rapid strides, the uranium suppliers remaining in 1966 will have excess capacity to meet the principal civilian demands until perhaps 1975. Fourth, any post-1966 government requirements of even modest proportions, when added to the civilian needs, could cause a shortage of domestic uranium in 1967 and probably would by 1975. Fifth, our reserves and production costs are such that we can be competitive and prosper in the kind of uranium business we foresee after the expiration of existing contracts, but our annual earnings might for some years be at levels considerably below those now enjoyed. We would expect that this decline in earnings would be more than offset by the growth and profit potential that we expect that we can achieve from our Navajo coal property. We continue the vigorous pursuit of new mineral discoveries and development, having budgeted $1,300,000 for this purpose in 1960. Today everyone wants to be a "growth company", and we've tried hard. We increased the market value of our company from $9 million to a $100 million in 10 years, the share value from $5 l/8 to $48, but obviously we didn't make the grade. Proof of our failure rests on the fact that our stock sells for 12 times earnings, pays dividends regularly, and lacks the appeal that seems to be found in those who are betting their scientific skill in the techno-