domestic uranium in 1967 and probably would by 1975. Fifth, our reserves and production costs are such that we can be competitive and prosper in the kind of uranium business we foresee after the expiration of existing contracts, but our annual earnings might for some years be at levels considerably below those now enjoyed. We would expect that this decline in earnings would be more than offset by the growth and profit potential that we expect we can achieve from our Navajo coal property. We continue the vigorous pursuit of new mineral discoveries and development, having budgeted $1,300,000 for this purpose in 1960. Today everyone wants to be a "growth company," and we've tried hard. We increased the market value of our company from $9 million to a $100 million in 10 years, the share value from $5 1/8 to $48, but obviously we didn't make the grade. Proof of our failure rests on the fact that our stock sells for 12 times earnings, pays dividends regularly, and lacks the appeal that seems to be found in those who are betting their scientific skill in the technological race into the yet unknown. We just aren't equipped to do this so we still do our building with profit blocks constructed out of the material we can find and know how to work. Maybe in the sixties we'll find a way to be appreciated by the financial community. At least we proceed with the kind of confidence in the future that you can only find in construction men when they have the rare feeling of knowing where their next meal is coming from. 16