programs with our own forces as we have done for Marcona, Pima, Lucky Mc, Goldsworthy, Navajo, and Blackwater Coal, all completed within the amounts that had been projected. Third, the company's policy of advance selling of its mineral production under long-term contracts wherever this is possible has given assurance of future profits in a way that sets it apart from other mining companies. The backlog of undelivered mineral sales exceeds $1 billion for Utah's uranium, steam coal, coking coal and iron ore, over thirty-four times last year's revenues from these minerals. Not included in this figure is the $735 million of unfilled long-term contracts of Marcona. This gives us an assurance of future earnings unknown in the mining industry, and indeed in most other industries. Much of this backlog is insulated against declining metal prices or rising costs. Given our background in the construction business, where the backlog is rarely more than twice the size of the annual volume put in place, Utah has wanted the comfort and protection that comes from underwriting our mining investments with long-term cost-protected sales agreements. Fourth, while there is no individual that owns as much as 3 1/2% of the company's shares, eight of its eleven Directors are drawn from families whose combined holdings would exceed 50% of the common stock outstanding and who have, therefore, a very substantial stake in the success of the company, and a very direct financial incentive to see that the interests of the shareholders are protected and enhanced. They are playing with their own chips, and this induces a degree of diligence that a Director's fee alone cannot command. Fifth, despite the family holdings, -18-