Scuttling of the Graf Spee Pocketing of the Pocket Ship As a cornered fugitive will sometimes take his own life rather than be captured, so sank the Admiral Graf Spee in the harbor of Montevideo Sunday evening. As the sun went down, so did the pocket battleship that had been causing considerable havoc among British merchantmen afloat during the past few weeks. Naval experts are at a loss to account for Hitlers decision to scuttle the craft rather than permit its internment under the neutral flag of a South American republic. Four motives for the order may be assigned: To prevent the plans and specifications from falling into hostile hands; to conceal weaknesses developed or discovered in the prosecution of raids; to destroy evidence of the disputed charge that gas bombs had been used; to arouse sympathy outside of nazi circles and rekindle a waning war spirit in Germany. Regardless of the cause in which a ship has been engaged, or the nationality of its crew, or the pattern of its ensign, or the damage it has wrought, one cannot contemplate the deliberate scuttling of a gallant vessel in a safe anchorage without feelings of both regret and resentment. In the battle that occurred just before the Graf Spee fled from three British cruisers it had given a good account of itself. The result was a death list of 36 nazis and 72 allies. The pocket battleship had previously wrecked nine British freighters as they were encountered on the Atlantic. Two sister raiders are still a large the Deutschland and the Admiral Scheer, now the objects of continued search. From reports received, the nazi commander, Captain Hans Langsdorff is not as gallant or as game as the vessel he sank. In a published report he blames the Uruguayan government for hurrying his departure with the alternative of internment. Such matters are subject to international law based on treaties and practice, but well defined and generally understood. Uruguay had no choice if she desired to remain neutral. Vessels are permitted to remain immune from attack in neutral harbors for a specified time and purpose; they are to be considered seaworthy when they refuel, repair leakage and make ready for a dash to the open sea. All these preparations had been completed and the commander was only awaiting word from Hitler as to whether he should flee or fight. Under the circumstances Uruguay was obliged to fix a time limit to neutral hospitality. Otherwise the British government would have been justified in ordering a resumption of the battle amid the miscellaneous shipping craft in front of Montedvideo. Had the commander merely reported facts and let Hitler and Goebbels embellish the tale with their disregard for truth and vivid imaginations, he would have made a better impression on the rest of the world. Nearly everybody has some sort of admiration for a plucky loser, but very little for a whiner who tries to shift his responsibility to the shoulders of a friendly bystander.