be completed earlier. With these facilities in place it is logical to assume that 1972 earnings will rise sharply above present levels and will continue to rise for several years thereafter with Peak Downs coming on, Goonyella stepping up to the full contract rate, Goldsworthy hitting the 8 million ton mark, and the uranium market regaining strength and momentum. About these years we have little concern. For 1970 and 1971 we are dependent upon improved performance from existing facilities and therefore any increases will be less dramatic than the steep rises that occur when a new profit center is added. Nor are we without our near-term problems. Perhaps the most serious handicap we have in continuing to report the kind of increases that investors love and come quickly to expect is in uranium. For 10 months of fiscal 1969, all of 1970, and the first two months of 1971 we are compelled under our stretchout contract to sell uranium at a formula price to the Atomic Energy Commission. This price is now around $5 a pound in contrast to the $8 price that we used to enjoy, and I may add, enjoyed very much indeed. Since we sell the A. E. C. 1 million pounds a year and we now do so at a price about $3 lower, we have lost almost $3 million profit before tax in comparison with our 1968 experience, and this is a heavy burden to overcome. We have offset it in some measure by uranium sales to private customers at prices above the government price and strengthening as the years go on. However, the delay experienced in nuclear reactors coming on stream has reduced the near-term demand for uranium, softened the near-term market, and made it difficult to sell uranium in the early years of the 1970's. The longer term outlook for -10-