production. The Japanese steel industry, which is our primary customer, doubled its purchases of iron ore and coking coal in the 5 years ending 1964, doubled it again by 1969, and is planning to virtually double it again by 1975. Copper supplies have been unable to keep pace with rising requirements and the surplus of copper predicted year after year by the experts has consistently failed to materialize. The Japanese demand for copper has again outpaced the average growth. Japanese imports of copper in ore and concentrates rose from 192, 000 metric tons in 1965 to 450, 000 in 1969 and are expected to hit 828, 000 tons by 1975. Second, except for copper the market prices of minerals that we produce and sell are not characterized by rapid and violent fluctuations. Iron ore, coking coal, steam coal for utilities, and uranium are largely sold on a negotiated basis and, while the prices change, they do not do so with the volatility that characterizes such minerals as lead, zinc and copper. Third is the backlog of mineral sales contracts which brings with it several important benefits. Its size -- 42 times last year's mineral revenues -- indicates an assurance of growth in volume for a long time to come. The fact that we have sold ahead makes it possible to predict with unusual accuracy the assured further sales volume in the future. 80% of the backlog is represented by long-term contracts with cost escalation protection which freezes in profit margins, and, coupled with assurances of quantity, brings a predictability of higher earnings and an absence of downside risk that is rarely found in other companies. The predictability, the reliability, and the growth that the backlog -9-