5. Perhaps our best protection from the Peruvian political risk lies in the fact that we would make even more money if Peru were to nationalize the mine today and free us from the obligation of having to deliver Peruvian iron ore at charter rates entered into when the market for ships was substantially lower. I believe this situation will continue long enough for us to reduce substantially our dependancy upon Peru. As to the Japanese economy it seems to me there are two questions. What will be the short range impact on Utah of the current softness in the Japanese economy that has made itself evident in the last six months? More significantly, what will be the impact over the longer range on Utah's ability to sell advantageously to Japan that portion of its capacity not currently covered by long-term contracts and to bring in new mines whose output would more logically go to the Japanese market? For the short range I do not anticipate any particularly serious impact on Utah's earnings for 1971 from the softness in the Japanese market. Our spot sales of coking coal are already committed as are the spot sales of Goldsworthy iron ore. Marcona also has its output reasonably committed. Our Island Copper production will not be available this year and in any case copper basically sells in a world market and will be more affected by the status of the world economy. Nor can the outlook for the Japanese steel industry be isolated completely from the rate of recovery in the US market and the possibility of a shutdown of the US steel industry as a result of labor contract negotiations. We are not particularly apprehensive about 1971. Turning to the longer range outlook I agree with the position taken by